

RAM

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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INTEGRATING ACTION

Karma may be considered as the union of Spirit, Mind and Matter *in action*. Being filled with earthly ideas, full of erroneous conceptions derived from modern science, religion and philosophy, we do not realize the power that lies within ourselves; so we think of Karma as an external thing. Karma is a synthetic word which means the progress of a being. There is no action without an intelligence; no intelligence without a consciousness; no consciousness except as a centre of energy in the One Life.

"As a man thinketh, he acts." If we think we are derived from forms, then our sense of Self is contingent upon a given form, and when the form is dissolved, where is our sense of Self? It dissolves with the form. If our sense of Self is contingent upon this or some other idea of mind, then upon the dissolution of that mind our sense of Self is dissolved; we survive but

we have no sense of Self. But if our sense of Self is identified with the One Life, the One Spirit, the One Consciousness, which is the eternal, infinite, boundless, immutable container, pervader of all, then how can that sense of Self ever be destroyed? Once this idea is grasped, a new cycle begins to manifest immediately in the sphere of intelligence, because the processes of correct cognition are three: the *perception* we have of the One Self and our identity with It; *inference* from within, without, instead of from without, within; and *living* what we have seen and inferred.

When we start acting from the basis of the One Self, we begin to practise Brotherhood, to treat other men through the body as spirits, as souls, as the One Self. We deal with forms as forms, with ideas as ideas; but whenever we are touching a form, we know that invisible within that form is intelligence, and that when we strike the

smallest difficulty in accepting the infallibility of a Leader. The worship of God is an intellectual impossibility for thousands to whom the worship of a divine being, called the Nation, seems the most natural thing in the world. The old tendencies have not been abolished (they never are); they have merely taken new and, on the whole, less desirable channels. Fascism digs these new channels for worship and provides, in its cult of the divine Nation, a kind of lightning-conductor, upon which thousands of reluctant infidels can discharge the accumulations of their will to believe.

Blind belief is hydra-headed. Destroyed in one shape it assumes another. As Disraeli said on a famous occasion "man is a being born to believe; he "will find altars and idols in his own heart, in his own imagination". As he predicted, even the scientific modus has proven unsuccessful, for to-day people who refuse to believe—and rightly—in miracles in the physical world are illogical enough to accept miracles *i. e.*, lawlessness in reference to the moral order of the universe. The remedy lies in philosophy—not in the cold speculations of logicians and verbose abstractions of metaphysicians, but in the ethical philosophy now corrupted and degraded into the many religious creeds. Real philosophy like that expounded in the *Gita* or the Gnostic Lore, by the Buddha or Shankara, has both its metaphysics which purify and satisfy the mind and its ethics which elevate and inspire the

heart. This is being recognized more and more.

In the latest issue of *The Personalist*, published by the School of Philosophy of the University of Southern California, the Editorial is entitled "Can We Rethink Our World?"—and is a reasoned piece of work admirably done. It says:—

The danger will arise out of the effort still to live by ideals that in the common range of thinking have passed away, but whose passing we will not admit. Their justification no longer has a hold upon the common mind.

Now we are entering a new order, which bears in it the greatest possibilities of human success or of human disaster.

There is nothing so important as that the world should once more set itself to thinking, and there is little time. We must think quickly and more broadly than has been our wont. Our thinking must include the whole world, for if any element of the world order is left out it will be fatal to all the rest.

This living world can be achieved only as an organism looking toward ends, and it demands that every individual must accept the role of looking toward the common interests of society. None of us can claim exemption from the common duty, as each may claim profit, safety, and care from the common sacrifice. The problem of this hour is whether the leaders of men and the masses of our population can think of themselves and of society organically. Can we re-think our world?

body, we bruise the intelligence. Within that intelligence is soul, identical with our Self, and when we bruise the intelligence we bruise the soul, which in reality is the same as our Self; just as a tidal wave, the bruise comes back to us; that is *testimony*. Every man's body is a visible testimony of how he understands matter and how he treats it and how he makes use of it. It is a visible reflection of his so-far acquired intelligence by experience in and through forms of this kind. His treatment of his own body and the bodies of others, his treatment of his own mind and the minds of others is the visible and standing witness of how far the Christ-processes, the genesis, the conception, the antenatal preparation of the spiritual being have gone on in him.

We see three lines of evolution everywhere in nature, but highest of the three, because all-inclusive, is spiritual evolution—the perception of Self as Self apart from body or form, apart from mind or intelligence, apart from beings of any kind—the sense of Self. When we set our mental house in order so as to conform to that idea

we shall see how this triple cycle, the spiritual, the intellectual and the physical, conjoined in one, operates to illumine us within. In our minds there are faint fires lighted here and there by isolated true ideas, fraternal actions, longings and aspirations for a better life, to know better, to do better, to understand better. When in that inner world, which is our mind, a sun bursts into endless luminosity we have the state of a Christ, of a Buddha, of a Krishna. These fundamental ideas have over and over again been shed on the world by men who before us passed from the human to the supreme, from the intellectual to the spiritual consciousness, from physical knowledge, psychic knowledge, intellectual knowledge, into the full blaze of Wisdom. When the most ordinary man seizes hold on them, he will work that very evolution in himself which is in truth a revolution, because it will transform him into a new order of being. Then, instead of dwelling amidst the funeral tapers of time, he dwells in the shadowless light of the eternal illumination.

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM IN EUROPE AND THE WAY OUT

[**Julien Benda** is one of the leading French critics. Most of his writing is in support of the Intellectuals as against such writers as Bergson, Barrès, and Romain Rolland, who are not detached from sentiment. In one place he has written that what Bergson calls "Intuition," is really intelligence as distinguished from a species of bureaucratic functioning of the mind. M. Benda's latest work is *Discours à la Nation Européenne*, and deals with the part that pure intellect should play in the rebuilding of a European nation.

Only in October last year an effort was made in France, under the chairmanship of M. Paul Valéry, to gather together in a conference the intellectuals of Europe. Mr. Langdon Mitchell, writing in *The Saturday Review of Literature*, (New York, March 10th) gives a translation of a letter written to him by Count Hermann Keyserling, who was the only German to answer this call of culture, to which England, Norway, Spain, Holland, Italy and Hungary contributed each its quota. M. Benda was one of the distinguished Frenchmen who took part in the Conference. Count Keyserling writes:—"Accordingly we decided to form an association independent of all politics or any other empirical aims, under the neutral title of 'Société d'Etudes Européennes,' to have as its aim the cultivation of relations between persons of distinguished intellect, through the furthering of such inspiring contacts as were the custom in Goethe's time, and the recognition of the radiating character of all living intellect and its natural resistance to organization." This is one practical method of attempting to revive the civilization that once existed in Europe and of which M. Benda here writes.—EDS.]

In order to discover what can save European civilization, the first thing to be done is to decide what has doomed it, and what is corrupting it more and more each day. In the first place, has a European civilization existed in the past?

Yes, a European civilization definitely has existed. But despite the opinions of certain doctors, more apostolic than veracious, and inclined to assertions more charitable than true, a European *nation* has not existed nor has there existed a European political community; but there has existed a *moral* European community—Christendom. Charlemagne was proclaimed Emperor of Christian "Europe". Above all, there has existed an intellectual European

community; it was due to this that all those who devoted themselves to the things of the mind, from the Pyrenees to the Vistula, felt they belonged, not to this nation or to that, but to Europe, an undivided Europe. A tangible symbol of this intellectual Europeanism was the University life of the Middle Ages. In the precincts of these Universities, students from all nations jostled one another and manifestly felt in greater sympathy with each other, despite differences of nationality, than with those of their compatriots not interested in intellectual life. As for their masters, their degree gave them the right to teach "throughout Christendom" (*jus ubique docendi*), and this Europeanism was accepted unreservedly by all the intellectual

youth of the continent. It never occurred to a student from Paris to wonder why he should have the German Albert the Great, or the Italian Thomas Aquinas or the Englishman Alexander of Hales as mentor, nor to a "bachelor" from Vienna to consider it unwise to entrust the formation of his mind to the Frenchman Jean Gerson. This intellectual cosmopolitanism was obviously favoured by the fact that all such men wrote their works in one language, Latin. One may say that the small consideration given by learned men to the ethnical *désinence* of the mind was maintained by the majority until the end of the eighteenth century, despite the fact that they had abandoned Latin for their national tongues. Prior to this date, we find very few thinkers beyond the Rhine pointing out that Luther and Eckhart possessed essentially Germanic minds, and even less do we see French doctors proving that Descartes or Racine could only have been born on this side of the Vosges. Voltaire was able to write in 1767: "An immense republic of cultured minds exists in Europe." Again, obviously referring to such cultured people, J. J. Rousseau observed shortly before the Revolution:—

To-day there are no longer Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards nor even Englishmen; there are only Europeans. The same tastes, the same passions, and the same habits are common to all, because none of them has had to accept a national mode of thought from any isolated institution.

The historian who quotes this opinion, and who obviously agrees

with it (Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, Vol. I, p. 257) accounts for it by the fact that all men had their minds formed by the same masters—the Jesuits—who were a cosmopolitan order.

* * *

This European civilization, which was due to the existence of a moral unity and fellowship among the intellectuals, transcending national divisions, has been destroyed, as a European civilization, by the action of the intellectuals themselves. One may say that, from the seventeenth century onwards, a movement contrary to that which I have just described makes its appearance, a movement in which the intellectuals make common cause with national sentiment awakening in certain countries and are eager to nationalise their minds. It seems that we must admit that the movement began in Germany, with such men as Thomasius who considered it shameful that one could not be thought cultured unless one had had a Græco-Roman education; and even with Leibniz who, in his *Pensées sur la Pratique de la langue Allemande*, not only did not content himself with exhorting his fellow-countrymen to become more conscious of their individuality, but was already inciting them to become so in opposition to French thought, to which influence, he said, they had too long submitted. The movement was greatly strengthened, a hundred years later, by the Lessings and Schlegels, and by the *Dramaturgie de Hamburg*, the sole

aim of which was to save Germany from following in the mephitic wake of the literature which produced Racine and Voltaire; by Herder whose intellectual cosmopolitanism was transformed into a most uncompromising nationalism and whose example demonstrates, according to a specialist in the intellectual history of Germany (Lévy Brühl, *L'Allemagne depuis Leibniz*, page 154) the secret continuity which, notwithstanding the improbability of such a supposition, connects without a break that nineteenth-century Germany which we call realist and that eighteenth-century Germany with which we generally contrast it, terming it idealist*; by Fichte, whose *Discours à la Nation Allemande* are nothing less than a summons to his compatriots to break with all non-German culture and to plunge into the dark and unique embrace of the Germanic soul; by Niebuhr, whose works, as he says himself, strive to bury the German soul in the depths of its own particular individual sources.

Until the war of 1870, the work of the destruction of the intellectual unity of Europe had affected scarcely any but the Germans; on the morrow of this war, with the Mommsens, the Treitschkes and all the Pangermanists (see Ch. Andler: *Le Pangermanisme philosophique*), it takes on, for the first time, a consciousness of itself and

a technique not seen before; moreover, it invades the Latin world; in France with Jules Lemaître (*vide*, his violent articles against the influence of Ibsen and Tolstoi), and with Barrès, we see the formal desire, until then unmarked among the French, to have a culture which would be completely unsullied by external influence; henceforth, one only speaks of *French* science or of *German* science; authors attempt (especially in Germany) not to cite the names of foreign savants in their works; in 1904 the Rumanians were invited to the Petrarchan celebrations, because they were a Latin race, but not the compatriots of Goethe or of Shakespeare! And then there are the conceptions of Justice and Truth which must cease being universal and become "national"; Barrès writes that he wishes to learn only "Lorraine truth and French truth,"† to which Langbehn replies that he only desires German truth.

Since the war of 1914, it has been even more violent. Here are several examples: Some months ago a professor in a great German University, Dr. Haupt, declared amidst the applause of several thousand listeners, that Europe must learn that Germany, from that day, *had definitely abandoned the path of Western civilization*. (Quoted in *Le Temps*, September 11th, 1933.) Only a few years before, the Italian

* The whole passage should be read: "The antithesis is false," says M. Lévy-Brühl (i.e., the antithesis between the idealist Germany of the eighteenth century and the realist Germany of the nineteenth century); "there are not 'two Germanies'; there is only an evolution, sometimes favoured, sometimes thwarted by the intervention of the neighbouring nations and whose different phases appear more closely linked together as history surveys them from further away."

† See my *Trahison des Clercs*, p. 120.

Minister for Public Instruction and Fine Arts had delivered an official speech in which he said:—

Our artists must prepare themselves for the new imperialist function which our art is to fulfil. To this end a principle of "Italianity" must definitely be established. Whoever draws his inspiration from foreign art is guilty of "lèse-patrie," as a spy who admits the enemy by a secret door.*

Behold the state of open hostility between the national cultures, the will capable of stirring up this hostility and of glorifying it! Behold the catastrophe into which European civilisation is collapsing day by day before our very eyes!

* * *

How are we to save this European civilization? How can we recover it?

By restoring, notably amongst the younger generation, amongst the students, the feeling of this universalism of intellectual function and of cosmopolitanism of mind. For that, it is especially necessary, as I have pointed out in my *Discours à la Nation Européenne*, to raise the product of the intellect above that of the feelings, the works of science and philosophy above those of pure literature; because the intellect is universalistic while the feelings are much less so; because the value of a scientific work exists, or for the most part tends to exist, independently of individual genius and of the *language* in which it is written, whereas the work of the man of letters is, so to speak, indissolubly linked to this vehicle; because the work of the intellect is translatable

whereas that of the man of letters is not, or is at any rate very far from being so to the same extent. We must restore to credit such phrases as Renan's: "All those things which make up literary taste, charm, poetry, amusement, may be clothed in local form; but science, like the mind, is unique." This return to the honouring of the mind in so far as it is universal, overlooking any particularities which it may offer, will be difficult, if I am to judge by the fact that the best brains, those apparently most eager to rebuild European civilization, appear to be refractory, even unconsciously refractory, so deeply have they absorbed the doctrine of the nationalisation of mind. A little while ago, I was reading some pages of a French savant, whom I had believed completely exempt from this influence, the lamented Charles Pfister, Dean of the Faculty of Strasbourg. This professor, having just indicated the excellent works which the German savants had recently produced on the history of Alsace, considered it his duty to express the hope that France would not allow her neighbours "to monopolise" the study of this subject, and declared it to be "the duty" of the French University of Strasbourg and of the learned societies of the city "to mount guard on the Rhine". But what, I ask, is this idea of "monopolising" doing here? And the "guard on the Rhine"? The learned societies, whether French or German, have the duty of *mounting guard*

on the mind and, from the moment that good works are composed on the history of Alsace, a true priest of science need not worry whether they be the work of Frenchmen or Germans. In the same way, while on a lecture tour in Scotland a year ago, I heard a professor of the University of Edinburgh, during a banquet celebrating the memory of the great poet Dunbar, make his compatriots feel ashamed because the best editions of Dunbar are made by Germans. As if the important thing for this minister of the intellect ought not to be that good editions of Dunbar exist, not that they are not the work of his compatriots! Such nationalism of mind must be absolutely removed if we wish to return to a conception of the intellectual universalism which, once again, is for me the primordial condition for the resurrection of European civilization.

Some may object: You surely do not claim, however, to destroy the national characteristics of the mind, those which distinguish—so delightfully—the ways of thinking of a Frenchman, an Englishman and an Italian, even about the same subject. I do not claim to destroy them at all, but I beg these

different intellects to honour the essential part of the mechanism of thought, that essential part, in which, *precisely because it is essential*, these differences in the manner of thinking disappear. I have given in my *Discours à la Nation Européenne* (Chap. V.) a striking example of the differences in the Anglo-French ways of thinking (the Frenchman is H. Poincaré and the Englishman the physicist Maxwell), and I have shown how, as soon as they reached the essentials of the intellectual functions, they agreed.

The teaching of history could also do much. Instead of devoting ourselves almost entirely to setting forth to children the history of the nations of Europe independently of each other, we ought to tell them the history of that *undivided* Europe which has existed, as I said in the beginning of this article, in the moral and intellectual planes. And I return to this conclusion: You will only save European civilization by calling upon Europeans to honour moral and especially intellectual values, the only ones which have realized in former times, and which are capable of doing so again to-day, the unity of Europe.

JULIEN BENDA

* Quoted in my *Trahison des Clercs* (p. 52) together with other examples.

THE LEISURED WORLD

[Miss Cicely Hamilton, novelist, playwright and actress, is a traveller who observes changing Europe from her own vantage ground. She has recorded the results in *Modern Germanies*, *Modern France*, *Modern Italy* and *Modern Russia*.

Some still hope that widespread unemployment is passing. Others look upon it as the permanent mark of an era dominated by the machine: as the invention of more and more efficient machines is progressing, unemployment is bound to increase, producing in its turn the problem of leisure. It is perhaps the most pressing problem of to-day, on the solution of which the very existence of civilization depends. But leisure does not spell inactivity. The *Gita* says: "No one ever resteth a moment inactive. Every man is involuntarily urged to act by the qualities which spring from nature." Miss Hamilton truly envisages a leisured world in terms of the mode of life of the leisured class of to-day: when men have leisure they will do what the aristocrats do—behave charmingly, converse brilliantly, hunt and gamble. Western humanity is fast inheriting vast wealth earned by science; as it does not possess the moral capacity to use it, there is likely to be a ghastly squandering of the inheritance. The unhappy divorce of knowledge and virtue constitutes the problem of leisure, and it is more a moral than an economic problem.—EDS.]

One of the results of industrial depression, long drawn out, is a realization of our problem of increasing leisure; a problem inevitable in a mechanized world, and one which civilization must tackle, and speedily, if it is to live at peace with itself. Fundamentally the Luddites, the breakers of looms, were right in regarding the machine as a rival; their own age treated them as criminals and fools but time has justified their views. In calling after calling the machine has ousted the handworker; human thew and sinew, human craft and intelligence are year by year becoming less needful for provision of our sustenance and comfort. And the end is not yet, is not even in sight; it may be that, before many decades have passed, all our daily wants and daily amusements will be supplied by the obedient machine. When that happens we shall have attain-

ed to the real Simple Life; where the movement of a lever, the pressure of a button, will have superseded all the complicated processes whereby our ancestors provided themselves with their heat, light, food and amusement.

That a world fully mechanized will be a world largely leisured is a fact that needs little demonstration; the less need of hand and brain in the ordinary labour-market, —in the work of the factory, the office and the house—the more time we shall have to ourselves. But increase of leisure will not be the most important effect of the supersession of Man by his creature, the Machine; the change—the alteration of values—will have a moral and ethical significance. Man—western Man, at any rate—deprived of his work, will have to discover some new justification for existence. What that justification will be I do not pretend to

forecast; but I am sure that we cannot live without it.

Hitherto the majority of mankind has justified its existence, in its own eyes and those of its neighbours, by capacity for some kind of work; by production of food, by production of fuel, by production of clothing and ornament; by building, by soldiering, by fetching and carrying; by the exercise of arts and professions. For centuries after history emerged from the forgotten, Man catered for his wants with no other help than that afforded by domestic animals and a few simple hand-wielded, hand-made tools. Until the advent of the Machine and its consequence, the Industrial age, the world was run on the activities of men and women, whose trades and callings could be started with a minimum of capital; in the pre-machine era a man possessed of the weaver's skill might make his own loom and set it up at home, and so start as a cloth manufacturer. And think of the cost of equipping a modern gunner with his weapon, compared to the cost of equipping an archer with his bow! Capital counted for less in production, labour for infinitely more; and any section of the community that did not justify itself by some form of labour activity eventually fell into contempt. When Beaumarchais could jeer at a French aristocracy that it had "given itself the trouble to be born," that French aristocracy was within a few years of its downfall.

It may well be, however, that in the near future Beaumarchais' gibe

will have lost its point; and civilized humanity all the world over, will only "give itself the trouble to be born"—living thereafter, like the lilies of the field, toiled for and spun for by machinery. Already in large sections of the community the old relation between the worker and his tool has been reversed; the "worker" has become but an adjunct of his tool, an attendant on its needs and activities. Primarily, no doubt, the machine is the servant of man; but not for the first time in the history of the world the servant now dominates his master. Dominates and likewise humiliates; makes his skill of small value, his strength of small account; and in a good many instances, needing no help from him, casts him on the labour scrapheap.

When we are no longer workers, how shall we estimate our value? That, it seems to me, is the essence—the crux—of our problem of mechanized leisure. In times past peasants and artisans, oppressed by those in power, when they rose against their tyrants were spurred by the thought that they, the oppressed, were the workers, the makers, by whose toil and ingenuity the world obtained its daily needs. In all ages, and all the world over, the claim of the oppressed has been the claim of the worker to benefit more fairly and fully from the fruits of his labour. Nowadays that claim is less valid than of yore; because the loom or the engine—some form of machine—has taken over most of the work. While in the future it may have no

shadow of validity—capital, in the shape of the ubiquitous machine, having become the sole agent in production—that fact, of course, will not invalidate the claim of a human being for an equitable distribution of the goods he no longer produces; but the claim must be advanced on other grounds than a personal labour which has ceased to have any value.

So far in the history of the human race a leisured class, with no need to work, and no spur to its activities, has usually shewn symptoms of deterioration; and if the same symptoms are not to make themselves manifest in our mechanized world, some substitute for labour will have to be brought into our lives. What that substitute shall be, is our problem; and upon our success in discovering the substitute and applying it to our needs may depend the future of mankind.

We describe our present economic perplexities as a breakdown of the Capitalist System; but it would be a good deal more correct to describe it as a breakdown of the Labour System. It is Labour that is going, not Capital,—which every day, in the form of the Machine, increases its hold upon the world. With every day we are less and less workers, more and more capitalists; since, whether as plutocrats or whether as paupers, we live more and more by machine-made goods and services—that is to say, by the capital that science and invention have bestowed on us.

* * *

When one studies the develop-

ment of manner and custom, it becomes abundantly clear that the leisured classes, in every age and country, have felt the need of a substitute for work. To this day they are hunters, for the sake not of food but of activity; while another persistent characteristic of such classes is their insistence on rules of behaviour. It is fairly true to say of them that the less productive they are in actual work, the stricter their discipline of etiquette. The training required by any youngster intended for some form of useful hand-labour, such as bricklaying or carpentering, is easy of acquirement when compared to the training of a member of the old French nobility in the manners and graces of his caste. These people who thought it beneath them to soil their hands with spade or plough were subjected to a discipline of speech and behaviour amazingly rigid and complicated. Their lives were regulated by little rules of courteous etiquette; they were drilled to correctness of poise and of movement; and, if they were to hold their own with their fellows, a high standard was demanded of them in the difficult art of conversation. All leisured classes have evolved their codes of disciplined behaviour; but it was the idle, court-haunting section of the French *noblesse* whose code was the strictest test and most disciplined If the past is any guide, it would seem not unlikely that the leisured world upon which we are entering will evolve its stringent customs and codes of manners—as a measure of pre-

caution against slackness of body and mind.

And there is another fact to remember in this connection; that one of the characteristics of a leisured class—at any rate of a Western leisured class—has, so far, been a combative spirit. If proof were needed that strife is not always of economic origin, that proof could be discovered in the records of the “idle rich”; the one calling that has never been beneath the dignity of the “idle rich” is the calling that involves the shedding of blood—a Western aristocracy has always put its sons into the army. Something of the “leisured” inclination for the arts of war may be due to old feudal tradition, not even yet wholly extinct; but that a leisured class inclines to blood and quarrel is proved by the fact that it was among aristocracies that the practice of duelling flourished. The classes whose energies have been employed in agriculture or industry—in the earning of a living by some form of regular work—have never made a practice of the duel; in such classes, quarrel and the shedding of blood is the result of personal grievance and enmity; whereas in the duelling classes of society it has always been recognized that blood may be shed—must be shed, in fact—for a point of honour or etiquette. (The same tendency to be sudden and quick

in quarrel is said to prevail in the *apache* section of society, which is also, to a great extent, “leisured”; that is to say, its “work” is intermittent and irregular.)

There is another undesirable characteristic of leisure with which we may have to reckon in our mechanized society: the gambling habit. When a class has been sufficiently prosperous to feel itself secure, its members have often been addicted to high play—willing to risk their secure prosperity on a card or the throw of a dicebox. The fact is interesting and may have its significance for a special system which permits of leisure and security for all. Mechanized production, properly controlled, should mean economic security for the race in general: the human being—so, at least, we hope—will be able to live without fear of destitution; whatever may befall him in the way of ill-luck, or bodily misfortune, the machine will provide for his necessities. But if the average human being is of the same flesh and blood as the leisured classes of to-day and yesterday, then the same need of risk and excitement may stir in him, demand its outlet and find that outlet in gambling The average human being will still remain human, even in a world where he is not justified by work.

CICELY HAMILTON

EGOTISM AND IMPERSONALITY

[John Cowper Powys is well known both as a novelist and an essayist. In October 1933 he wrote for us on "The Magic of Detachment," and this month he is concerned with the ever-present opposites—Egotism and Impersonality. Most men and women, especially in the West, lead personal lives, and it is because of this that spirituality is so rarely able to flower there.]

Impersonality is not the annihilation of the human intelligence which is self-consciousness but an attitude of that intelligence—a mode of its vision; the impersonal attitude grows as that intelligence acquires a knowledge of cosmic ultimates. In Indian philosophy *Vyakti* is the finite personality, while *Purusha* is the Immortal Person who possessing real values of conditioned existence is not affected by its *Maya* or unreal values.—EDS.]

That great and mysterious pulse of ultimate life—that planetary rhythmic beat—that balance of the unseen tides—forward, backward—advancing, retreating—of the systole and diastole of the world—how can it be named? And the moments of magical harmony that it brings to our total being, to our body, soul and spirit subsumed in an unspeakable unity, how can they be named? These feelings are far more than pleasure, far more than joy, far more than delight. To call them by the tranquil word "Peace" would give to many minds too negative an implication. To call them by the exciting name "Ecstasy" would imply something too disturbing, too—what shall I say?—too violent. In my present discussion I will confine myself therefore, after the cautious traditions of the countryside, to the most simple and primitive word in our language, and I will call this mysterious feeling by the plain name of *happiness*.

Happiness of this rare and precious kind is, I have recently come to think, the real purpose, the real nature-inspired elixir of life—though so often obscured and confused and beguiled and betrayed—of all organic, and perhaps of all super-organic, entities! It has often come into my mind to think that there has been some mis-translation, some misinterpretation undergone, in those translated versions of the ancient books of wisdom such as I have been able to get hold of, where indifference is spoken of as if it were "indifference" to *happiness* equally with "indifference" to the grosser forms of pleasure and pain.* How could what is called by our Western Saints "the Beatific Vision" be beatific at all, if a person "only saw, *not felt*," as Coleridge says of his magical light in the sky, how "beautiful it was"? What, I mean, would such a vision be, if it were merely something *recognized*† by the lonely intellectual power,

* Not quite. In Hindu philosophy the Deity has three aspects, Sat, Chit, Ananda; the last of these is Bliss. Supreme joy is therefore also one of the triple aspects of the Spirit in man. In Buddhist philosophy Nirvana, the highest spiritual state, is one of peace and bliss actively experienced; it is not empty passivity, much less annihilation.—EDS.

† In yoga-philosophy it is not only recognition, but realization, *i.e.*, intimate experience in which the Highest is not only seen and felt but also known.—EDS.

rather than something in the attainment of which all that we are, our body, our soul, our spirit, found ultimate fulfilment?

As Heraclitus maintained, and in this point was followed by Hegel, it is out of the clash of opposites, out of the transcending of contradictions, that the balance-point between warring forces which we call "the Truth" emerges, becomes, exists, establishes itself.

And this law of the transcending, or if you will of the subsuming of opposites, applies to the psychological equally with the physical, to the spiritual equally with the psychological.

What we call *egotism* is that excessive, unbalanced, disordered discordant self-assertion which more than anything else causes the unhappiness of our Western World to-day. It is this "egotism" of a number of unbalanced individuals, which when it flows together, in the evil itch to assert oneself at the expense of someone else, in the evil itch to gloat over the discomfiture of someone else, in the evil itch to triumph over the weakness or over the strength of someone else, becomes so formidable, that I have got into the habit of calling "crowd-consciousness." This "crowd-consciousness" I have come to regard as one of the most objectionable of all the evil psychic phenomena that we are oppressed by to-day. And it is very powerful; for it is the inverted, the evil side of that transporting power of widespread human feeling that can work miracles.

My own instinct tells me however, though in this I speak humbly and tentatively, that *even at its best*, even when it works miracles, this crowd-consciousness is not a holy thing. We all know how quickly, at a touch, at a breath, at the wink of an eyelid, this miracle-working power can *turn into its opposite*, and commit the most abominable and shameless crimes!

No! If I am not mistaken, it is never the noblest human emotions that are projected, externalized, hypostasized, in the feelings of the crowd.

And now, having shown, as well as I can, that what I mean by "egotism" is a foolish, ungracious, greedy itch to assert our crudest and least considerate desires at the expense of anyone who comes near us, let me indicate, as far as I am able, what, in this particular essay, I mean by "impersonality".

From the cautious and tentative experiments in human nature—principally in my own—which I have so far been able to make, and I am an extravagant, and perhaps even an heretical, believer in the magical power of what we call the will to change our character completely, I have arrived at a shrewd inkling, I trust under the suggestion of good rather than of evil, that *impersonality*, as its extremest implication comes to be emphasized, over against the extremest implication of *egotism*, is not, any more than its opposite, a desirable thing.

It is the *Tao*, it is the mysterious way of all balances, that I am fumblingly and gropingly seeking; and

I seem to hear the voice of Kwang Tze, that most whimsical and poetical disciple of the great Laotze, whispering to me, on the long-drawn wind of this northern twilight, that the Tao must not be called the Impersonal any more than it must be called the Personal! It is, in fact—at least so I seem to learn from studying the writings of Kwang Tze—some indescribable Nameless that transcends both personal *and* impersonal.

Words are, however, in their living suppleness and in their organic complexity so slippery, so tricky, so treacherous, so much like phosphorescent water-snakes, that a person, catching at one faint clue and then at another, to these Eleusinian Mysteries, is forced to use each word as if it had a margin, a penumbra, a thin curve of the unrevealed portion of its lunar circumference, that extended a good deal further than the word's ordinary significance.

Putting the matter clumsily and crudely, and without that subtle, scarcely-discernible lunar penumbra, in which, at least to my Celtic mind, the truth can alone be found, where the word "impersonality" conveys something quite as different from the nameless Tao as the word "egotism" itself, is in what I might perhaps be allowed to call its *scientific* content. Scientific knowledge always claims—though its claim is often an extremely questionable one—to be "impersonal," that is to say, to be free from all those distorting, perverting, and deluding subjectivities, with which human passion pros-

titutes the virgin purity of objective truth. Mathematics is certainly, I fully admit, impersonal; "but so much the worse," thus in my Faustian nature I am tempted to cry out, "for impersonality!" Impersonality as the supreme clue to a cosmos, whose motive-force seems so essentially a *living*, and hence, of necessity, since mathematics is the science of the dead, so essentially a non-mathematical force, appears to my mythological mind especially unsatisfactory.

Is it not the "impersonality" of the materialist-determinist view of the system of things that lays its cruel icy finger, like John Keats' cold-hearted philosopher in "Lamia," upon the creative and living impulses which even the most idolatrous of our mythologies somehow manage to suggest?

I regard therefore this psychological antinomy, "egotism"—"impersonality," not as a cosmic struggle between good (impersonality) on the one side, and evil (egotism) on the other, but as an Hegelian contradiction. I regard the opposition of these two things as resembling the opposition of "Being" and "Not-Being," which, while in themselves they are less than nothing and are indeed totally unreal, find their reality in the concept "Becoming". In the same way I regard egotism and impersonality as a contradiction of two extremes that in themselves are meaningless abstractions but that find their "truth" in a third concept, corresponding to this Hegelian "Becoming".

And what, thus stated, is the

ideal that subsumes or transcends the opposition of egotism and impersonality? It must be, it seems to me, like "Becoming," an essentially *imperfect* concept; for a perfect concept must of necessity lift the whole issue into the region of the Absolute and thus, at a stroke, clean out of the sphere of our intelligible verbal categories. What the philosopher Croce so well says about *Imperfect Virtue* applies here. He says that the very essence of Virtue lies in its imperfection, in other words, in the condition of its *living growth*, and that Perfect Virtue, *ipso facto*, would cease to be Virtue at all! What we must look for, therefore, in the relativity of our present human state, is some ideal that, while transcending both "egotism" and "impersonality," retains the living principle of growth in both these extremes. Let us see what can be made of this. Is not the living principle, distorted and depraved in "egotism," the nobler concept of *egohood*; and is not the living principle, frozen and petrified in "impersonality," nothing less than *sympathy*, the feeling with, the rejoicing and the suffering with, other entities?

Our two words now are the word *egohood* with its centripetal implication, and the word *sympathy*, with its centrifugal implication; and our philosophical problem is to find some single word that will bring these two, with all their mysteriously wavering under-life and over-life, into one comprehensive ideal.

Such a word is, unfortunately for me, not to be discovered in the English language. Shall I be misunderstood if I make use of the phrase, "the Larger Self"?* We are all in the habit of talking rather loosely about our "lower" and our "higher" self. Now what I mean to imply by my expression "the Larger Self" is obviously not the same as either of these. "Larger" carries with it a somewhat different connotation from either "lower" or "higher".

Now if we return to our original words egotism and impersonality, whose hopeless and irreconcilable characteristics we are striving to overcome, it will, I think, be clear that what is wrong with both these extremes is their deadness. They are both, in their opposite ways, when you carry them to their logical limit, descriptions of the state of death. And in their death-truth, like our metaphysical Hegelian parallels, they turn out to be identical. Nothing is more egotistic than a corpse. It sympathizes with no one. It gives nothing to anyone. It makes way for no one. It is a ghastly and pitiful burden upon the hands of all. But nothing, also, is more impersonal than a corpse. This we feel unhappily enough, when, under the murderous logic of a deterministic materialism, the vast mysterious life of great Creative Nature Herself becomes one appalling "Golgotha and Mill of Death".

But "egotism" contains some-

* Why not the Sanskrit word Mahatma—the Great Soul, i.e., that human soul which has experienced the Motion of the Great Breath, the Universal Spirit or Deity.—Eds.

where within it the quickening principle of a legitimate "egohood," and "impersonality" can be interpreted in two very different ways. It can be interpreted according to that fantastic and entirely false conception of the Inanimate which the old-fashioned and let us hope totally discredited materialistic theories upheld. This is the lower view of "impersonality". But "impersonality" can also be interpreted in a deeper and more spiritual way, as something not lower, but higher, than what we commonly know as "personality".

We are thus in possession, if there is any cogency in my present line of argument, of two residual concepts, which we have arrived at by eliminating the logical death-extreme from both "egotism" and "impersonality". We are in possession of the living principle of "egohood," and we are in possession of a mysterious Something, that, though different from "personality," is richer and fuller than what we vulgarly mean by this word. But I cannot help being led on to the conclusion that in what I have called, for want of a single word, "the Larger Self" both these residual essences find their realization and truth.

We have all heard the story of

Plato's having visited the Orient, and may it not be that that blending of erotic egohood with ideal impersonality which is so striking a peculiarity of his habits of thought represents a *rapprochement* between East and West? Certainly in all the tantalizingly obscure and hopelessly scattered myths of my own Welsh ancestors, particularly in connection with the Legend of the Grail, a hesitant and tentative "third way" does almost seem to present itself to me, a way less "impersonal" than the way of the East, and less "egotistic" than the way of the West.

Would not one of the results of even the most childish glimpse of our mortal affairs from an extramundane view-point be a negation of the silly Western notion that progress in science implies progress in wisdom? And might not such a glance—none the worse perhaps for being childish—help us to recognize, as the Greeks and the Welsh seem to have recognized long ago in their kindred mythologies, that there is a way by which the Self can get the good both of Nature and Sex and yet not relinquish its ultimate awareness of belonging to a level of Being and of Life outside the whole turbulent arena?

JOHN COWPER POWYS

PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA

[Below we print two articles: the first is a sketch of the work of the Indian Philosophical Congress written by Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, one of the Secretaries of the Congress, which aims "to take philosophy out of the school-room and the cloister and make its appeal wider." The other, by P. T. Raju, M.A., Sastri, lecturer in Philosophy at the Andhra University, pleads for a reorientation of Indian metaphysics because "our very social life demands new developments in thought".

The baneful effects of the divorce between philosophy and life are being recognized more and more. The urge for a re-expression of philosophical principles and to bring their light into the lives of the people is also felt by philosophers abroad. In California through *The Personalist* a group of philosophically minded men are earnestly seeking to determine if some fresh influence of philosophy cannot be invoked in the reconstruction of the social order. Its April issue not only contains the first of the posthumous papers of the late H. Wildon Carr, but the editor continues his reflections begun in the last issue—"Can we rethink our world?" And now comes the April *Philosophy*, Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy, in which its editor publishes a letter from Sir Herbert Samuel under the heading, "The Present Need of a Philosophy". Sir Herbert says:—

The old ontology, the old ethics and the old social order, based upon systems of theology that were generally accepted, are crumbling under the influence of new ideas inspired by the discoveries of science. Urgent practical questions—of personal and social morality, of economic organization, of international relationship—press upon the peoples, but the leaders of thought give little guidance for their solution. This generation is dissatisfied, anxious, apprehensive. It feels itself as in a ship, launched on an unknown sea, without navigator, chart, or compass. Since the old theologies cannot meet the new problems, and since science cannot claim to deal with the larger issues, men are asking what philosophy has to say to the present age.

Next month we will print "Philosophy and Life," by C. E. M. Joad, which will be a further contribution to this problem of world-wide interest.—EDS.]

I.—THE NINTH PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

The first session of the Indian Philosophical Congress was held in 1925 under the auspices of the University of Calcutta. A band of enthusiastic Calcutta scholars under the leadership of Sir S. Radhakrishnan was responsible for its inauguration, and Calcutta has contributed in a great measure to its continued success, the next great contributor being the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner. The papers in succeeding sessions have varied in number and quality; the attendance has at times been none too good; but throughout it has been possible to rely on

Amalner for a good quota of papers and contingent of delegates.

From the first it has been our ambition to take philosophy out of the schoolroom and the cloister and make its appeal wider. The choice of the first President, Rabindranath Tagore, was significant of this aim. And though in the nature of things it was not possible to repeat such a choice in subsequent years, we have had other opportunities of linking philosophy with the national life. The second session of the Congress was opened by the Maharaja of Benares, the third by the

Maharajah Gaekwad of Baroda, (who sent a learned address though he could not attend in person), the fourth by Sir Rama Varma, an ex-Raja of Cochin, widely respected as a man and a philosopher; after a period of three years, filled up by men of affairs,—the Ministers of Education in the Punjab, Eastern Bengal and Behar,—the eighth session was opened by the Maharaja of Mysore and the ninth by the Raja Saheb of Sangli. Those who watched or read the proceedings know that these opening addresses were anything but nominal; in every case sound knowledge was displayed of one or more systems of philosophy, besides a keen desire for the furtherance of philosophical studies and pursuits, in view of their importance to all nations in the conduct of affairs of this world, to say nothing of the hereafter. The culmination, in a sense, of this line of thought found fine utterance in the speech of the Rajah Saheb of Sangli, who, in the light of his own philosophic studies, wondered whether the pursuit of perfection as an ideal in the place of expansion may not be a cure for all our present ills. It is a source of no small gratification to those who have been continuously associated with the Congress to know that it has succeeded so greatly in interesting and enthusing such high personages, who, by virtue of their position as rulers and the good example they set in the matter of a pure selfless life, are so eminently calculated to be the leaders of all thinking India.

The appeal of philosophy to men and women is that they should save themselves from the endless restlessness of modern life with its dissipation of energies and consequent despair, by betaking themselves seriously to the endeavour to see things as a whole, to obtain a synoptic vision, to break through the walls erected by custom under the sanction of reason, to cease to rely solely on the intellect, and to seek the intuition which underlies the intellect and is also its crown. Such was the message of Radhakrishnan as President of the eighth session at Mysore; the same message was repeated to a Poona audience in one of the public lectures organized in connection with the ninth session. The other lecture in this same connection was delivered by Madame S. Wadia who made an eloquent plea for Buddhi-yoga which is in effect the "intuition" of Radhakrishnan. Such presidential addresses and lectures are representative of the activities of the Congress in so far as it seeks to lift Philosophy from mere scholarship and link it with the life of the people to-day. To another type belongs the presidential address of Prof. A. R. Wadia who made a philosophical analysis of the life and teachings of the most interesting public figure in the country—Mahatma Gandhi. There have been other types of addresses too, like that of Principal Dhruva, which made a survey of recent philosophical literature and that of Principal W. S. Urquhart, which concerned itself with the present status of philosophical studies.

The address of Rai Bahadur K. C. Bhattacharya at the last session is a fine example of yet another type, pure and rigorous philosophic speculation. Philosophers do not all tread a beaten path; nor do they lose themselves in the sands of the desert.

The papers contributed are many and varied. There are at present four sections—Indian Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics, Ethics and Religion, and Psychology. It is somewhat of an anomaly that in India Indian Philosophy should be treated as a separate section. It would be more proper to include these papers in one or other of the remaining sections, according as they are metaphysical, ethical or psychological. But quite a good number of papers on Indian Philosophy concern themselves mainly with questions of the history of doctrines, and these require a section to themselves; there may come a time when such papers find a more suitable home in the Philosophy section of the Oriental Conference. One of the symposium subjects for the eighth session was the Possibility of Universal salvation (Sarvamukti); one of the subjects for the next session is the place of God in Advaita. It is in the discussion of such subjects that the Indian Philosophy section becomes most lively. The section of Logic and Metaphysics vies with that of Indian Philosophy in getting the largest number of papers; and in both sections, the bulk of contributions comes from Amalner.

This is a section exclusively for the serious. The section of Ethics and Religion provides some good papers. In the past it provided at least one controversial subject for a symposium—the possibility of a new ethic. Two interesting papers were contributed last year on "Mystical Experience" and on "Freudianism and Swadharma". Our Psychology section has not been as popular as it ought to be. This has been in part due to the failure to know the province of this section in relation to the Psychology section of the Science Congress. Dr. Purushottam's clear and eloquent presidential address at Poona on the philosophical implications of modern biological and psychological discoveries has no doubt served to clear the ground and given some indication of the type of papers that will find the most suitable home in the Philosophical Congress. The discussion of the symposium on "Idealism and the Physical world" was very lively.

The interest of both members and outsiders has been steadily increasing and it is not too much to hope that the Philosophical Congress has come to be a permanent feature of Indian academic life. Philosophy can never claim spectacular results, but there is reason to believe that its grip is none the less sure and steady. And not the least of the signs of hope for the future is the request of THE ARYAN PATH for an article on the Congress.

S. S. SURYANARAYANAN

II—THE NEED FOR REORIENTATION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

India has passed through many a political crisis. With every change in its political situation, new factors have been introduced into its civilization. It has had to face, either to incorporate or oppose, new ways of thought, new standards of morality, and new forms of administration. The remarkable plasticity and elasticity of the Indian mind have evinced themselves in the various ways in which it has tried to treat the novel factors. Whenever a new religious creed appeared, it was shown to be a part of the old creed itself, and the supersession of the latter by the former was prevented. Thus Buddhism, which once spread from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, was rooted out by the absorption of most of its fundamental tenets. Moral and political discussions were divorced from the philosophical.* What Manu or Parāśara said was the settled law. None was allowed to tamper with it. It had nothing to do with a philosophical principle, even though it be the central principle on which the conception of the world was based. Similarly political theories were in no way affected by philosophy. It was enough if our politics and morality did not conflict with the ultimate aim of life, viz., the realisation of the Supreme Brahman.

This indifference to ethics, poli-

tics, and other social sciences is the vulnerable point in Indian philosophy. A philosophy, if it is to satisfy fully the demands of human life, should not only provide us with a principle on which we can base our conception of the world, but also attempt to develop from it the sciences that are incident to social life. True, a synoptic view of the universe, an intellectual construction of it, should not be the sole aim of philosophy. It is in the ability to rise above such an attitude that most of the western systems are lacking. Their dominant attitude is one rather of intellectual curiosity than of a serious search after the solution of life's problems. On the other hand, we should not fail to notice that life's problems include the ethical and the political. They should be related to the same principle which is to explain the nature of the world. It is very often said that the outlook of Indian philosophy is practical, that philosophy, for the Indian, is not a way of thought, but a process of life. But philosophy, if it is to be a process of life, should be a process not of blind, but of conscious life, a life that thinks. Studies like ethics, politics and social philosophy, form part of our conscious life. Our life cannot avoid thinking about them. Nor can it sunder itself into discrete

* Some may say that the institutes of our ancient law-givers, like Manu, have a philosophical basis. But such a basis is rather religious than philosophical. No particular metaphysical system seems to be implied by them. Unlike Hegel and Plato, Manu has no metaphysics of his own. Dr. Bhagavan Das's interpretation of Manu in his *Laws of Manu* does not advert to any such system. Manu's code is accepted by pluralists like the Naiyayikas, monists like Ramanuja, and non-dualists like Sankara, alike.

and unrelated parts, and treat social sciences as having nothing to do with its theory of the world. Life is a whole, a unity, and its various phases cannot be left in isolation.

The work of philosophy, says Dewey, is—

the ever new undertaking of adjusting that body of traditions which constitute the actual mind of man to scientific tendencies and political aspirations which are novel and incompatible with received authorities. Philosophers are parts of history, caught in its movement; creators perhaps in some measure of its future, but also assuredly creatures of the past.”*

But our philosophies of the past have nothing to say about political aspirations, and we have no new philosophies now. We are therefore obliged through sheer necessity to import and adopt foreign views. We find some of our leaders following Rousseau, some Marx or Russell, some Hegel, others Croce or Gentile. But their views, necessitated and developed under dissimilar circumstances in foreign lands, may not well suit our purpose. One element here and another there may seem adoptable. But the danger of importing such isolated elements from a system is too great to be encouraged. We have our own world conception. And the imported views, if they do not agree with it, will work havoc on our lives by disintegrating them. It is necessary that our own individuality should react to the new problems that face it, discover its own solutions.

* *Philosophy and Civilisation*, p. 4.

It is this absolute separation of our metaphysics from our social sciences by our ancient philosophers that is mostly responsible for the growing apathy towards them. *Our philosophers are now studied mostly in the spirit of antiquarian research, and not with a view to find a solution for the problems that face present-day society. One feels as if our philosophy has nothing to do with life, it is not living but dead. One cannot help doubting whether one is not clinging to a body from which the life has escaped. It may be admitted that our philosophy satisfied the needs of our ancestors centuries ago, when India was not in close contact with the rest of the world. But now the conditions have changed. That our philosophy is not able to cope with the complexity of the present situation is shown by the indifference with which it is treated by men in public life. A Tilak or a Mahatma Gandhi may give the Bhagavad-Gita a new interpretation. A Radhakrishnan may infuse life into our fossilised philosophical ideas by viewing them in a new light. But every such attempt is resented by the orthodox Indian as a misinterpretation which he would regard as something not to be seriously taken. It is not of serious concern for his life. He can take active interest in it only if it is shown to be a necessary development of his own views. He is now faced by new problems, and any solution which the philosopher wishes to offer him should be demonstrated as the logical outcome*

of his own theories. Only thus can our philosophy be now brought to bear on life.

It is high time that philosophers should enter upon such a task. For a number of decades the work of translation, interpretation, and exposition, has been carried on. Besides the vast amount of work accomplished by western scholarship, Indian scholars have been recently very active in that direction. To mention a few, Dr. Gangadhara Jha has seen that no important work on Indian philosophy remains to be translated; Dr. Radhakrishnan's work from the standpoint of comparative philosophy leaves little to be desired; throughout all his works are scattered hints for new developments, and he himself has given a new synthesis in his *Idealist View of Life*; Dr. Dasgupta, besides the two massive volumes he has already presented to the world, promises to bring out four more such; and the attempts at an encyclopædic survey of Indian Philosophy by the Academy of Philosophy and Religion (Poona) will, we may expect, leave little to be done any further in the field of interpretation and exposition. Already, there are signs of lagging enthusiasm for such work.

Not only the conditions in the present philosophical circles, but also our very social life demands new developments in thought. It is as if the current of our old traditions has met the opposite current of the new ways of life and the progress

of either has been checked. We have to find a new synthesis which would open the way for further progress. We should not allow the traditional and modern modes of thought and life to play into each other's hands for the downfall of our philosophy and consequently of our civilisation. Hegel said that a civilisation without metaphysics would be like a temple, "in all other respects richly ornamented, but lacking its Holy of Holies".* And ours would be no exception to his view. The duty of the philosopher now is "to effect a junction at some point in the new and the old, of deepest sunk customs and unconscious dispositions, that are brought to the light of attention by some conflict with the newly emerging directions of activity".

"Philosophies which emerge at distinctive periods define the larger patterns of continuity which are woven in effecting the enduring junctions of a stubborn past and an insistent future".† Only by performing this function can Indian philosophy still maintain itself and our civilisation. It can be performed only by attempts at new syntheses. Thus the philosopher would be serving his society by supplying new patterns for future thought and action.

Ideals to guide society in its different branches of activity cannot be framed unless the world-conception is brought to bear on the social problems. This requires a reorientation of our philosophy. In spite of our great ancient

systems, we cannot boast of any organisation of our philosophical sciences. Our systems contain discussions mostly on religion, metaphysics, logic, psychology, and certain rules of life which are rather religious than ethical. Even they are promiscuously mixed up, not distinguished and systematised. They have all to be organised. We have to import from the West the spirit of organisation. We have been politically conquered for want of it, and our philosophy may lose its interest for the same reason. Though systematisation of our various branches of experience should not be the sole aim of philosophy, it should be an essential part of it. Our metaphysics should be made the foundation of our logic, ethics, and social and political philosophies. With this aim it has to be reorganised. It should be made to yield logical principles which would guide our social and political thought. Then only will it be living, and touch our very lives. What great efforts have not been made by Plato to adopt his metaphysical theories to his conceptions of state and society! Similarly, the part played by Hegel's conception of the Absolute in the organization of the states of Central

Europe is not little. We need not follow any of these philosophers blindly in their methods. Yet that there is the need of relating all branches of Human knowledge cannot be gainsaid.

In advocating this plea, it is not meant that the work of interpretation and exposition should be stopped now. What is pleaded for is the need for a reorientation of our metaphysics, which has not yet been seriously undertaken. Nor is it implied that there should be only one philosophy in the future for India. If a nation professes only one philosophy, we may say that it is intellectually dishonest or inactive. No particular system can dominate, and satisfy the aspirations of, every mind. At every point of history there can be found diverse currents of thought. Each can be developed into a separate system. But what is required of every system is an organised and connected treatment of all human sciences. Such a treatment is possible only after a special formulation of the metaphysical theory. As our Indian philosophy is wanting in this respect, a reorientation of it is needed.

P. T. RAJU

* *Science of Logic*. Tr. by Johnston and Struthers, p. 34.

† Dewey: *Philosophy and Civilisation*, p. 7.

THE NOVEL: ITS INFLUENCE IN PROPAGANDA

["The novel with a purpose, the novel with a thesis, triumphs," wrote Lion Feuchtwanger. In this essay **Gerald Gould**, author of *The English Novel of To-day*, shows why the novel makes an excellent propagandist. We append to this article some pertinent remarks by **H. P. Blavatsky** written over forty years ago, bearing on this subject. The extract is taken from the Editorial article of *Lucifer*, November 1889.—EDS.]

The question of the place and value of the novel as a means of propaganda for national and humanitarian causes falls naturally into two parts. The novel, after all, is only the particular form, which for various reasons has at the present time superseded most others in popular favour, of the thing which has delighted all ages of mankind—namely, the story. We cannot, in the first stage of our enquiry, put the novel in opposition, for instance, to poetry, because, in poetry and in prose narrative alike, the actual story element has always been a predominating one. We have to remember that hundreds, and even thousands, of years before the novel, as we know it to-day, began to develop, poetry, and specifically narrative poetry, was in high favour. Whether in its epic or in its dramatic form, it filled the place in the life of the ancient Greeks which the novel fills in ours. When Aristotle said that poetry was "more philosophical" than history, he did so for the specific reason that the poet could shape conclusions to establish a moral point, whereas history was bound down to external facts. The phrase which we still so commonly use, "poetic justice," was a legacy of this Aristotelian theory.

It must not be supposed that Aristotle was asking for any sort of crude and convincing adaptation of fact to theory: such, for instance, as we get in the sentimental Victorian tales which reward the good boy with wealth and punish the bad boy with poverty. Aristotle, in common with all the great Greek writers, had grasped, more clearly, perhaps, than it is grasped by most people to-day, the fact that it is impossible to chop up experience, into artificial sections, putting fortune on the one side and character on the other. Character and circumstances play into each other's hands, and help to shape each other in real life, and consequently must do so in fiction, if the fiction is to be convincing.

Sir Philip Sidney, the first English critic to write on literary questions with a profound understanding of general principles, praised narrative poetry for its power to capture and hold the attention; but already, in Sir Philip Sidney's time, there existed, as a result of the Renaissance, some of those early prose tales in Italian out of which it may be said that the modern novel directly developed. Not, of course, that we could not go even further back, if we wanted to, for origins. There were imaginative prose tales in both

Greek and Latin, long before the Italian *novella* appeared, and it is only for convenience sake that the modern novel is dated from one point rather than another. But the point to establish is that, in all periods of man's development, the story, as such, has had a tremendous appeal.

I have mentioned outstanding instances in the development of Western civilisation: indubitably the same truth holds of the older civilisations of the East. From childhood to old age, both in the life of the individual and in the life of the nation or race, everybody wants to be told stories, of one kind or another; and it is therefore not hard to see why so many people have chosen the story medium as a means of propaganda.

We come now, however, to the second part of our enquiry. Why is it that the old love of poetry has so largely given way to the popularity of prose fiction? I can speak only of my own country and my own time, but certainly nowadays in Great Britain one is both surprised and delighted if one finds anybody with a keen and sustained appreciation of poetry. Many people go through a youthful stage of poetry reading, but in maturer years put aside this interest as if it were one of the idle whims of adolescence. To find a mature person, of ordinary interests and accomplishments, who keeps up an active and vivid interest in poetry to the extent of looking out for new poets, and re-reading the established classics, is extremely rare, even among the most

highly educated classes; whereas it may be roughly said that the whole adult population reads novels, and that their popularity increases yearly.

The change from verse to prose, like so many other things in the changes of civilisation, is largely due to an external and mechanical discovery: in this case, the printing press. So long as stories depended upon human memory, and were handed on from one generation to another by word of mouth, the rhythm of verse had definite "survival value": it enabled stories to be remembered easily, and therefore preserved. There is no doubt that the activities of the printing press have gone far to destroy the necessity, and therefore the use, and even the existence, of human memory.

More and more, then, in spite of the competing claims of the wireless, the talking pictures, and so forth, people rely for entertainment and distraction upon the novel. The foregoing historical outline can be summarised in two assertions—the human being, as such, loves a story: the convenient form for the modern human being to indulge this taste is the novel. It may be added that, in Great Britain alone, roughly four thousand new novels are published every year, besides vast numbers of reprints.

The propagandist, then, is faced with this situation—he wants to get his message accepted by the largest possible number of people: how is he to get at his audience? The old simile of the pill and the

jam can scarcely be avoided here. The reader may be unwilling to swallow the pill of moral or political reform unless it is disguised for him with a sweet-tasting story to help it down. Even the advertisement writers have long learnt this lesson. When recommending a particular brand of goods, they no longer consider it sufficient merely to assert that the brand is good, or even that it is the best of its kind. The up-to-date advertisement begins at some distance from its actual subject, or, rather, object; it beguiles us with an anecdote or something of the kind, and only when our interest is already roused do we find that we have been led up to appreciation of somebody's patent medicine, or tailoring, or cosmetics.

There is surely no reason to pursue by psychological investigation the natural and universal love of a story. It is so primitive and basic that it can scarcely be explained by anything simpler than itself. Yet, if we need an explanation, it can easily be found in the common desire of the human being to dramatise himself, and to see himself in a nobler posture than he can take up in everyday life, or in circumstances more exciting than his own. The child who is told a fairy tale dreams of being a fairy prince: the boy who reads an exciting adventure story dreams of going on like adventures himself; and this tendency by no means disappears, though it may grow less crude and obvious, with increasing age.

The propagandist, then, will

naturally make use of this tendency. When song and dance were the natural communal means of expressing emotion, the preacher of a popular cause would strike his harp-strings and sing what he wanted people to believe. Now, he finds it easier and more expedient to appeal through the written and printed word.

But, it may be said, though all human beings like stories, they like other things as well. Their psychological equipment includes not merely imagination, but reason. Why should the propagandist not go straight to his purpose, and tell us what he wants us to accept through exposition and argument? Of course, in many cases, he does so. Political campaigns are still mostly conducted by direct propaganda, though the political speaker who knows his job by no means neglects the aid of apposite anecdote. But, broadly speaking, we may say that the human reason is not anywhere near so highly developed as the human imagination, and that therefore the appeal of mere bare argument is apt to meet with little response. There have been, it is true, in the history of the world, purely philosophical or sociological documents which have had an enormous influence on historical development. It is commonly said, and with as much truth as such an unqualified statement can be expected to possess, that Rousseau's "Social Contract" sowed the seeds of the French Revolution. Similarly, Burke's essay on that Revolution had great influence on British political thought; and

so, later on, had John Stuart Mill's essays on "Liberty" and "The Subjection of Women". But the influence of these propagandist and didactic works is almost wholly indirect. Of every million citizens who have been indirectly influenced by Rousseau's "Social Contract," it would be pretty safe to say that only a few thousand, at the utmost, had ever read the book. Possibly the majority have never even heard of the book. Its influence has been exercised through the acts and words of people who had read other books which took their inspiration, often unintentionally, from the original argument.

How different is the challenge of a work of fancy or imagination! It can become immediately popular. It can pass directly into the hands and minds of the millions. It may be read for the sake of enjoyment; whereas, at the present state of our mental development, most people regard the tackling of an abstract case as a task, and even a hardship. There are those who *do* enjoy political or ethical debate, but they are still in a minority. To make a cause popular, something more colourful must be used.

The outstanding historical example of effective propaganda through fiction is, of course, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. The average man or woman, at the time when this work appeared, would no doubt have admitted vaguely that slavery was a moral wrong, and that the slave trade could not be carried on without the violation of elementary rights, to say nothing of individual cruelties; but the average man or

woman, while admitting this, did not get wrought up about it. Then came along an author who presented the wrongs and cruelties in a concrete and dramatic form, a series of human pictures which moved human feeling. It was no longer a question of slavery in general: it was a question of a particular suffering fellow creature—a mother wickedly parted from her child, or a man brutally flogged to death. Those pictures had a direct effect, as they were meant to have, upon emotion; and emotion is a much stronger force than logic.

It would be impossible to discuss the use of fiction for propaganda in the world of to-day without going into questions which are still controversial, and therefore outside the immediate scope of this essay, which pretends to deal with no more than the bare question of why and how propaganda is best embodied in the story form. I venture to think that even this bare essay may, to a certain extent, prove its point by illustration as well as argument. Readers may have wondered why I began with Aristotle. It is true that he is the earliest, and remains the greatest, of literary critics in the whole of Western civilisation, and that most of our theories on æsthetic points get their ultimate inspiration from his speculations. That might be a good enough reason in itself, but it was not the main one. By beginning more than two thousand years ago, I was enabled, in a sense, to tell a story—to trace through the centuries the history of fiction.

That is of necessity a much less thrilling *kind* of story than one in which the protagonist is a human being like ourselves; but, even so, it is surely more persuasive than a dogmatic statement of contemporary fact. There is magic in the formula, "Once upon a time . . .,"

with which the old fairy tales begin; and, because we live by action, our first instinct, when we read, is to want a tale of action.

This is why fiction is so good, and indeed so necessary, a means of propaganda.

GERALD GOULD

A NOTE ON THE ABOVE

A new era has begun in literature, this is certain. New thoughts and new interests have created new intellectual needs; hence a new race of authors is springing up. And this new species will gradually and imperceptibly shut out the old one, those fogies of yore who, though they still reign nominally, are allowed to do so rather by force of habit than predilection. . . . It is finally those who, amidst the present wholesale dominion of matter, material interests and SELFISHNESS, will have bravely fought for human rights and *man's divine nature*, who will become, if they only win, the teachers of the masses in the coming century, and so their benefactors. But woe to the XXth century if the now reigning school of thought prevails, for Spirit would once more be made captive and silenced till the end of the now coming age. . . .

Take advantage of, and profit by, the "tidal wave" which is now happily overpowering half of Humanity. Speak to the awakening Spirit of Humanity, to the human Spirit and the Spirit in man,

these three in One and the One in All. . . . What the European world now needs is a dozen writers such as Dostoevsky, the Russian author, whose works, though *terra incognita* for most, are still well known on the Continent, as also in England and America among the cultured classes. And what the Russian novelist has done is this:—he spoke boldly and fearlessly the most unwelcome truths to the higher and *even to the official classes*—the latter a far more dangerous proceeding than the former. And yet, behold, most of the administrative reforms during the last twenty years are due to the silent and *unwelcome* influence of his pen. . . .

It is writers of this kind that are needed in our day of reawakening; not authors writing for wealth or fame, but fearless apostles of the living Word of Truth, moral healers of the pustulous sores of our century. . . .

To write novels with a moral sense in them deep enough to stir Society, requires a great literary talent and a *born* theosophist as was Dostoevsky.

H. P. BLAVATSKY

THE COMMON SOUL OF ALL RELIGIONS

[Hugh McCurdy Woodward is Professor of Philosophy of Education at Brigham Young University in Utah, and on several occasions he has been visiting Professor of Education at the University of Washington. He is the author of *Humanity's Greatest Need*, a review of which appeared in our pages of August 1933. The *raison d'être* of this book is seen in its dedication "to the increase of tolerance, to a better understanding between peoples and races and to the rising tide of World Unity". In the following article Dr. Woodward demonstrates that all religions have a common soul, and because of this the idea of monopoly (all too common among orthodox religionists) should give way to a tolerant and sympathetic attitude. We should emulate surely the broadminded man as described by Confucius, who sees the truth in different religions, the common heritage of their divine origin.—EDS.]

In every clime, in every time, and among all peoples, religion is man's most common expression. In creeds, cults, and churches, animists, Mohammedans, Christians, Buddhists, and Hindoos worship by the millions. In religions, ancient and modern; with ceremony, emotional and rational; through rituals, varied and numerous, men respond to images, symbols, personality, and to principles. In his struggle to understand the mighty forces and the glorious beauties about him, the individual strives to respond knowingly and effectively to that great mosaic of expressions in Reality which science calls Nature and religion calls God.

Confucius, the master moralist of China, once said:—

Religions are many and different but reason is one. The broad-minded see the truth in different religions. The narrow minded see only the differences.

It is wholesome practice to occasionally separate one's self, at least theoretically, from all localisms, creeds, and cults, to watch the millions of human souls from the

savage to the highest philosopher, and, in all forms of religious worship, to struggle for self-realization and self-expression. In such an attempt to view the whole of religious response, the differences in doctrine and in ritual are minimized and there merges gradually the *Common Soul of All Religions*. This Common Soul is as evident in the worship of the savage as in the great master. It is the striving of the ego for a fuller realization of self, a fuller realization of the Great Universal Intelligence out of which all things come; a fuller realization of the relations which exist between the self and the not-self; and a constant struggle to maintain the most satisfactory adjustment possible.

Man, the most complex of all nature's creations, is of many types and many tendencies. In every place and in every age he differs greatly but no discussion of him is complete without the recognition that before everything else he is incurably religious. Religion does not represent a mere stage in the development of man out of which

he emerges into a more perfect state. It is a process and a phenomenon of man's growth forever present in every stage of his evolution.

Man is not religious because of the social habit of his ancestors. He is not religious because of some habit which has been forced upon him. He is not even religious because of his own choice. He is religious because of certain fundamental characteristics which make him man and without these characteristics he would not be man. As long as he is man, he is therefore necessarily religious.

The Common Soul of all Religions grows out of man's universal tendency to solve certain great unavoidable problems. These problems were once mentioned by that eminent scholar and teacher, Lyman Abbott. They come as a natural result of man's intellectual gifts. These gifts of nature represent those peculiar characteristics which differentiate him from the animal and from the lower orders of life.

It is in man that the awareness of self or self-consciousness first makes its appearance. This consciousness of self is not so pronounced in the lower types of the race but grows progressively with developed man. It finds its clearest statement among the great philosophers in the profound question, "What is Man?" It appears early in all religious literature. The declaration of the Hebrew prophet is a fair example. "What is man that thou art mindful of him? And the son of man that thou visiteth him?"

The struggle to sense the inner nature of self has been the signboard which has pointed the way through the ages to greater and greater philosophical researches. It is the basis of much of the religious urge and the central problem of psychology.

As the mind becomes aware of the nature of self it becomes aware of its relations to the not-self, or the forces by which it is influenced and with which it must reckon. In the midst of these perplexing forces the second great problem arises: "What is the nature of the forces among which I find myself?" In the primitive forms of this problem it is much less definite. The object of study is less unified, nature presents itself as chaotic forces, but the same phenomenon of the self trying to understand the not-self is present. At first the world appears to be capricious, uncertain and unorganized. Gradually its forces become more unified into groups of pagan gods and finally merge into the unity of one Great God. Then the question: "What is God?" becomes the central problem of philosophy.

As man becomes more and more aware of his own nature, he finds that certain adjustments to the not-self produce satisfaction, and certain adjustments produce pain. Different paths are open to his conduct. Independent choice becomes inevitable. Reason concerning results that certain modes of conduct will have on his welfare plays an ever-increasing part in his life. Out of this condition

comes the third unavoidable religious problem: "What is the right relation between man and God?" The various answers which man gives to these three questions constitute the philosophy of every sect and every creed.

As he becomes aware of his power to make an independent choice between the different possible ways of acting, man becomes conscious of his responsibility to make the right adjustment. At this point a fourth question emerges in his religious development. "How can the proper relationship between God and man be brought about?" From this question, either implied or stated, grows every organized ritual and sacrament of the various groups.

The ritual or sacrament is organized according to the best intelligence of the group and represents what is thought to be the most efficient method of doing honour to and receiving desired help from the controlling forces in nature.

Man cannot help asking these questions. He is endowed by nature with self-consciousness, reason, independent choice, and the will to act in the most effective way. Out of the exercise of these gifts of nature arise all of his metaphysics, ethics, and doctrinal interpretations as well as his numerous rituals and types of organized religions. Since there seems to be no limit to his power to develop along these characteristics, he instinctively feels something of his unlimited possibilities for self-realization and pictures

himself a child of God. This feeling of kinship to the Great Universal Intelligence is the very soul of worship in all its forms. The most undeveloped savage is not without it and the wisest philosopher cannot escape it.

The answers man gives to these great questions are necessarily incomplete. His guesses are many and different, which naturally leads to great variation in his religious philosophy, ritual and organizations. If one tries to understand religion by a study of its differences, he is soon lost in confusion and chaos. He will find it much more profitable to study its common elements. The differences are due to different degrees of understanding and to mistaken judgments, while the soul of religion grows out of the fundamental nature of man and God.

In the lower forms of religion, such as animism, the world is very chaotic. Man reads his own nature into every object. The trees, mountains, rivers, and animals are all endowed with individual spirits. The unity of nature has not yet become evident. Extended observation soon recognizes order in many of the forces, and the millions of individual, capricious spirits are reduced to a lesser number of pagan gods and goddesses. Representing as they do different forces and phenomena, these gods are yet very individualistic and are liable to all the passions and weaknesses of man. Continued observation shows the weakness of some of the hostilities between the gods and in turn reveals a larger unity throughout

the whole of nature making possible the conception of one Humanity, one Truth, and one God. Thus man travels in his religious life from chaos to cosmos. From satisfactions of his selfish desires, to the quest for truth and humanity. From his varied schemes to escape the avenging wrath of his many gods, to a desire to be at one in purpose and action with the purpose and will of the one just and living God.

To sense *The Soul of All Religion* is to see every religious system, every creed, every religious device in its functional relations. God talks to his children in many different languages. The institutions must be very different to meet the different degrees of development. The individual who adjusts to animism as a rule, is unable to adjust to the religions of unity. A man who lives largely in his stomach and sex organs is unable to respond to a higher spiritual philosophy. One group must not judge another without knowing how efficient are the ideals of that particular group in accomplishing the ends for which they are developed. With this point of view, we can honestly ask the question of all religions, all

creeds, and all cults, "How efficient is your system in bringing about a constructive growth in the people you are trying to serve?"

It becomes our business, to sense the great inevitable drive in all religions and to search out the good and give credit for the same. The idea of monopoly must give way to a tolerant and sympathetic attitude. Favouritism on the part of God cannot be a part of a modern adjustment. *The Common Soul of All Religions* grows out of man's urge for self-realization, for self-expression, and for his constant desire for secure happiness. His particular type of religion is always a result of the way he answers the great problems: "What am I? What is God? What is the right relation between God and myself? How can this right relation be brought about?" Gradually we realize that we see only in part at any given time, become less dogmatic, and more appreciative of the efforts of others. Not until we have reached this attitude are we prepared to do justice to the many religions and do our best to aid them in the particular work they are prepared to accomplish.

HUGH M. WOODWARD

SPIRITUAL EARTHQUAKES

[Pramathanath Mukhopadhyaya is already known to our readers. In this article two questions are raised: Will modern science sufficiently expand to include religious science? Will new discoveries, archaeological and anthropological, compel the modern savant to bow with reverence before his ancient peer for possessing a profounder wisdom? The formidable difficulty is the corrupted and deformed condition of religions. Esoteric Science, to which our author refers, is an exact science, but little is known of its real tenets. Without the key which that Esoteric Science offers, the modern investigator will not be able to decipher the real meaning of his excavations and finds, and so will not succeed in valuing the Wisdom of the ancients. That Esoteric Science formed the very foundations of what was once the Universal Religion. In every age, under every condition of civilization and knowledge, the educated classes of every nation made themselves the more or less faithful echoes of one identical system and its fundamental traditions. What was this system, this source? If coming events are said to cast their shadows before, past events cannot fail to leave their impress behind them. It is, then, by those shadows of the hoary past and their fantastic silhouettes on the external screen of every religion and philosophy, that we can, by checking them as we go along, and comparing them, trace out finally the body that produced them.—EDS.]

Even careful scholars have sometimes permitted themselves to be led away by hasty conclusions in matters in which conclusions are to be expected only at the end of the enquirers' journey.

The cement of facts collected should be allowed to set, before any top-heavy theory structures are sought to be built upon them. The universe of knowledge, like our Earth herself, has an uncanny knack of readjusting itself by earthquakes which not only crack, but pull down, structures not firmly built on the granite bedrock of truth. These spiritual earthquakes may have their epicentres in the realm of new findings or in that of new conceptions. We shall illustrate this by two examples.

The complex of ideas, beliefs and practices which we call Hinduism is, admittedly, an amalgam of several factors. It may also be that the incidence and coherence of these factors have not been a homogeneous occurrence with reference to what in mathematical language we call the co-ordinates of Space and Time. They may have been diverse in their space and time "origins". Nevertheless the Hindu concept has, on the whole, been an organic unity in spite of some parasitic growths now and then, and exotic graftings here and there. Scholars have been wont to divide its evolution broadly into three stages—Pre-Vedic, Vedic and Post-Vedic. Historically, such divisions may stand the

strain of future earthquakes. But it has to be remembered that the order of regional distribution and of historical sequence of vital and spiritual events is but a superficial and tentative scheme, conventional and convenient, but not deep and dependable. The geologist is not deceived by what meets his eye on the surface strata of the earth. He knows that there are bends and faults of the rocks concealing deeper links and affinities of formations. So also must the historian of spiritual history take stock of the deep, dynamic, vital links and affinities which underlie what but meets his eye on the surface screen of space and time. He should take deep borings before asserting that such and such spiritual entities had or had not existed in the Vedic or Post-Vedic Age, or in this region or that. There may be a live, dynamic background of affiliation and co-ordination beneath and behind all superficial diversities of regional and historical cultures. On that background perhaps the Pre-Vedic, Vedic and Post-Vedic all stood, met and co-operated. The "orthodox" historian may miss that background of *élan vital*, and notice only the isolated, spasmodic origins and endings of spiritual entities, the forced robbings and borrowings of spiritual values. He only knows that a particular idea or institution was borrowed or "grabbed" by this country or by that. But to those seers to whom the dynamic background itself is revealed, great creative ideas are never born, and are never borrowed or robbed, but

subsist, and can only be embodied and vehicled suitably to the competency of a given age or assemblage of men. It is the conditions of their latency or patency which vary in different ages and types of culture. The seers will see and discern where the blind will not. Some apparatus may be delicate enough for all lengths of the spiritual wireless waves. Others will respond only within limits. The common historical testimony as to how and when and where great creative ideas and institutions originated and spread should therefore be admitted with the door not bolted and locked but left ajar or even wide open.

That the above is not merely a "mystic" precaution has been proved again and again by many a sharp rap and many a rude knock. Where that rap or knock has not been answered soon, the door has been burst open, and the new apparition or vision of fact has spelled confusion to those who have bolted themselves in. Events in recent history have been many. Nineteenth-century science had bolted herself in with the "billiard ball" atom and a universe caught and secured by the net of Newtonian Dynamics. But towards the close of the last century she began to hear the strange rap on her door. She has now come out in the open. The universe is no longer a prisoner. It is now on parole. The atom is no longer an atom, but has proved a universe in its turn. The old bars and fetters have fallen away and no new ones have yet been forged. It seems as though

Science might after all sign their release order. And with that she will sign her own death warrant also as an opponent of Religion and Mysticism. The opponent dead shall then be the living exponent and helpful component of Spiritual Experience.

But let us come to archaeology for an illustration. We all know how the wonderful cave-paintings and bone-engravings of the prehistoric cave dwellers of Spain and France have proved a riddle. In the face of such findings, we are called upon to substitute an altogether new set of values for those that so far have been in vogue in the appraisal of the prehistoric man and his "lower cultures". Some have seriously thought of a lost continent to reconstruct the logical chain of the genealogy of this finely artistic "savage".

Another illustration we shall take from the realm of modern physical theory. In the ancient lore of different countries (including India) the material universe has been likened to a vast sphere. In India, the Scriptures describe it as Brahmanda—the Cosmic Egg or Sphere. The Indian Book of Genesis commonly begins with a Primordial, Undifferentiated Cosmic Stuff which it calls *Ap* or *Apsu*. In that Stuff, the Creator casts the "Seed" of creation. The Seed grows and expands to become the Great Egg or Sphere or Universe. The underlying idea is threefold. First, the physical universe, though immense in dimensions, is still a bounded system,

which, however, does not mean that there may not be myriads of other universes beyond the universe of our ken. Secondly, the "boundedness" of the physical universe implies that it may be possible for an appropriate agent—say, the light ray—to go round it. Thirdly, that this universe grows and expands—also perhaps contracts and oscillates—with reference to a possible nucleus. These are the clear implications of that ancient idea of Brahmanda.

For long this idea has been regarded as queer and childish. The immature primitive mind thought of the universe around it after the pattern of the "egg," and it was prompted in this by the sight of the blue dome of sky or of the luminous belt of the Milky Way round the starry firmament. The analogy of the egg has no application to the material universe as a whole. Space is limitless in all directions, and the universe is unbounded. That it grows and expands (one of the root meanings of the word Brahman in Brahmanda) is a fantastic idea. That has been the orthodox cosmology of Science. But this, too, has been shaken by a recent earthquake. Relativity ideas have proved the curvature of space and, with it, the boundedness of the physical universe. The universe has become an immense sphere again. Not only so. Both mathematical theory and astronomical observation require this universe to be an expanding (and, possibly also, contracting and oscillating) universe. To sum up, it has become the old Brahmanda

again in all essential features. New Astrophysics may not yet be thinking in terms of the "egg". That is perhaps because its thought of the physical universe is still abstract mechanistic thinking, and not vital, spiritual thinking which is concrete and complete thinking. It is, however, thinking of the universe in terms of the soap-bubble blown by a child. The bubble expands and, possibly, bursts at last. Bursts into what? That is more than one can say. Is this idea too—backed as it is by formidable mathematical reasoning and accurate observation—childish? If so, the ancient seer and the modern savant have both been playing in short clothes.

But let us come nearer home and somewhat nearer our own times. Yoga, Mysticism, the Cults of Shaivism, Shaktism, and so forth, form, and have for many centuries formed, an integral part of the Hindu complex. They pertain to the core, the nucleus of that complex. The tendency of modern scholarship has been to regard all this as primarily Post-Vedic. There have been some vague references to Pre-Vedic sources, Dravidian or otherwise, in the case of some minor features. But, generally speaking, Yoga and the rest are believed to be both alien and subsequent to the culture of the Vedic Aryans. These formed no part of the "simple animism" of the Vedic hymnners. They were exotic. Now, as regards the first point (that they were alien and

exotic), we shall not say anything here beyond this: that we do not certainly miss them in the background and spirit of Vedic culture; that there always existed an esoteric side to that culture; that the Āranyakas, including the Upanishads—note that both the terms meant रहस्य,—hidden, mystical—co-existed with the ritualistic side as its counterpart and the culmination of Secret, Esoteric Doctrine, not necessarily in their present forms and linguistic garbs, but in spirit and substance; and, finally, that even the Purana which is, or appears to be, historically the latest, was, in its fundamental form as the tradition of Ancient Wisdom, the earliest axis of that Vidya or Culture.

As regards the second point—that Yoga, Shaivism, and so forth, are subsequent graftings on the Vedic Cult—the unearthed findings of what now is called the Indus Valley Civilisation have proved a very unsettling earthquake. Yoga, Mysticism, Shaivism, Shaktism, and the rest *did* exist in that Pre-Vedic Age. Not only so; they formed part of an ancient culture which was not confined to the bounds of India, but stretched far and wide. In fact, the Indus Valley findings appear to have closed the circuit with the dynamic background, the *élan vital* of human spiritual experience, to which we referred. So Yoga is not something quite new. History ought to be more careful and less assertive now.

PRAMATHANATH MUKHOPADHYAYA

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE PORTRAIT OF AN EGOTIST*

[John Gould Fletcher, whose acute analysis of Amiel we publish this month, is known on both sides of the Atlantic. Perhaps by reason of his ancestry and environment (for he has Scottish, Irish and German blood in his veins, and was born in the United States), his interests are very wide and include music, painting, metaphysics, mysticism and oriental art. With regard to religion, he believes in a fusion of Buddhism and Christianity. His publications include both poetry and prose, and he is a contributor of critical articles to several periodicals. Mr. Fletcher is one of our early contributors, having written in the September number of our first volume on "Blake's Affinities with Oriental Thought".—Eds.]

The reputation of Henri-Frédéric Amiel has suffered a great eclipse in the present-day world of European political dictators, Bolshevik experiments, civil wars in China, militarism in the far East, non-co-operation in India. And it is no wonder. The reader of the modern age is generally too hurried and too harried a person to read through a *Journal Intime* which records, with painstaking and minute analysis, every detail of the life-long failure of an obscure Swiss professor to attain either worldly success or inner happiness. It is enough for us to know that Amiel was highly praised by the most prominent Victorians, notably Matthew Arnold, for us to ignore him. For the Victorians, with their universal faith in mechanical "progress," their lofty lip-service to Puritanism, and their gnawing doubts and distrusts whether, after all, God *was* in his heaven and all *was* right with the world, are more remote to us to-day than the men of the thirteenth century. Neither the modern mystic or the modern

materialist are ever again likely to pay any attention to them.

Nor do I think that, in Amiel's case, this publication of further extracts from his *Journal* is likely to bring him back to favour. The new extracts tell us something more about the man, but nothing new about the writer. Here are the same heart-searchings, the same details of dilatoriness and procrastination, the same desire to be fundamentally virtuous, without being able to distinguish between real virtue (which is always heroic, never a matter of rules) and the conventions of society; and the same useless and futile self-reproaches, as in the larger *Journal*. The new extracts only reveal that into Amiel's life, when he was thirty-nine, and sexually virgin, there came a young widow with a six-year old son who offered to him not only marriage, but who would have gladly consented to become his mistress, if he could have agreed to take her. He dallied, parried, discussed the possibility of another match with a man she did

* H. F. Amiel: *Philine*, with an Introduction by D. L. MURRAY (Constable and Co. Ltd. London. 5s.)

not love, and in the end yielded, when past forty, only to recall another woman, whom he named Egeria, whom he had kept waiting for him for nine years. Philine—for so he named the young widow—was grateful to him for his somewhat pedantic protectiveness, devoted to him as a slave, and would have gladly married him, but he felt that marriage would have implied emigration from Geneva, where he had already vegetated for twenty years, and was doomed to vegetate for the rest of his life. (Why he should have wanted to emigrate, unless he was afraid of some scandal with Egeria, it is impossible for us to say.) But as with his still-born literary ambitions, again here he dallied, idled, refused to assert himself, leaving in the end both Egeria and Philine desolate, and angry at each other (for of course he had told each of the other's existence). Such is the unheroic, tragic, absurd, preposterous story that these pages unfold.

If this revelation of masculine perverseness—carefully suppressed from the pages of the original *Journal* as published by Scherer, Amiel's intimate friend,—is not enough to disgust the world with Amiel, then I do not know what will. Unfortunately, he was presented to the gaping Victorian audience by Matthew Arnold, as a man too tender-hearted, too conscientious, to profit by experience at another's expense. But here is final proof that this indecisive character made two women suffer, and the introduction to these pages

mentions two others who also loved him, and suffered: Fanny Mercier, who helped to edit the original *Journal*, and Celestine Benoit who likewise pursued with him a long Platonic flirtation that ended only with his death. If not to make others miserable is in itself a virtue then we can truly say of Amiel that he did not possess it in any degree. He possessed it, indeed, to a much lesser extent than the rake, Casanova, about whom Havelock Ellis has truly said that he seems to have left no woman either heart-broken or resentful. Nor can we say of Amiel that the sufferings he caused were due to mystical scruples, to a feeling that he was dedicated to some higher service to God than that of the flesh. The opening pages of this *Journal* are in themselves proof to the contrary. There we find him cultivating voluptuous thoughts by reading all the outspoken pagan authors: men like Martial, Ovid, Parny, Byron. His "purity," which misled Matthew Arnold into admiring him, was neither a natural inclination, or forced on him by anything more than the conventions of the provincial town where he lived. It was the mask of an imagination which revelled in ideas of impurity, which it did not dare to carry into practice.

What sort of man, then, was Amiel? A careful reading of the *Journal*, or of this supplement to it, will supply the answer. He was, fundamentally, an egotist. Equipped from youth with an interest in speculative thought, and the apt pupil of the great meta-

physical leaders who were, at the time, recreating German philosophy, he returns to Geneva to assume a minor post as teacher, and remains there apparently without ambition for the rest of his life. Meanwhile, he is writing his *Journal*, which reveals how torturing his ambition really is. It is the sort of ambition that can never make decisions for itself, never listen to the voice of instinct which says to man what, for him, is the right path—it is an ambition which forever falters and hesitates, wishes forever to be assured from without as to the course to follow, and finds no moral support in itself—is in fact continually swayed by others. It is just because it is incapable of following any course of action out to its logical end, without hesitation or remorse, that Amiel's character becomes thus enmeshed in himself. He analyses, picks himself to pieces, puts himself together again, lets events carry him along, shrinks from any decision. He himself says of himself that his character was "feminine". Never was a diagnosis more profoundly mistaken. To live as Amiel lived is neither to be feminine, nor masculine, but neutral—and to be neutral is to be egotist: it is to lack either sympathy enough or hatred enough with whatever the world has to offer of good or evil, to be able to make up one's mind in regard to it.

It is for this reason that I, personally, am unable to agree with Mr. D. L. Murray, who says in the introduction to this volume, that it "is an unrivalled exhibition of

what Mr. Hugh I'Anson Fausset has brilliantly diagnosed as 'the disease of dualism'. It exhibits the sufferings and failure of the divided consciousness with a clearness and poignancy not easily to be matched in modern literature." What seems to me to be rather more characteristic of Amiel, is his intense limited self-consciousness. He can literally not feel what Philine felt, nor Egeria, nor any of these other people, because he lacks the imagination to put himself in their place. He has neither the mysticism nor the practicality to see anything beyond himself. And just for that reason he is profoundly unable not only to meet life, but do anything more than deny it. As he writes, in a lucid moment:—

I should be happy to be either the author or the critic. Both have arrived, have done something, and made names for themselves, while for a long time I have taken the road that leads nowhere, and have, as it were, wantonly and in a sombre frenzy, torn up my flowers, destroyed my seeds, wasted or killed my gifts, sterilized my life, squandered my savings and my memories, conspired against myself, against my success, against my race and my name. I have, so to speak, pursued and sought out with a diabolical instinct the means to annul myself, to make myself barren, powerless, useless, and have almost succeeded. Actually I am despoiled of character, of individuality, of memory; I have no object, no intellectual capital; I have neither wife, nor children, nor home, nor any longer youth, no credit, no influence, no self-confidence, no smiling future. My frenzy is spent. And whence did it spring? From the shame of having a desire and from the fear of not being able to satisfy it.

Distrust of fate and weakness of will, that is what has made me entirely negative, what has driven me into indifference and inaction. So as not to be refused by fate, I have asked nothing of it. So as not to be humiliated, I have wished for nothing. So as not to be conquered, I have not fought. So as not to be mistaken, I have affirmed nothing and made no choice. So as to remain independent, I have forsworn all ambition, and renounced all power—Zweifel, Ver-zweiflung, Diabolus.

That the will-to-power, suppressed and negated, only rankled all the more in this man may be proven by the above passage, no less than by every page he wrote. What could have cured so deep-rooted an egotism? Only, I think, the study of some of the great mystic utterances of the past. The single sentence from the *Bhagavad-Gita*, "Perform action without attachment to action" makes the entire Journal unnecessary. That the mystic solution also demands renuncia-

tion and sacrifice is obvious—but they are real renunciations, real sacrifices, where what has been sacrificed and renounced is also fully valued and known. Amiel suffered from the Puritan element implicit in Christianity, which wrongly classifies the sins of the flesh as being more evil than those of the spirit, and supposes that anyone can be pure without being able to distinguish clearly between purity and impurity. The mystic discipline, on the other hand, sets before man a higher goal: to "put off holiness and put on intellect". From the dark night of the senses, or of the soul, to the light of full intelligence that goes through both unscathed—such must be the aim of the mystic. But such a solution would have shocked Amiel; just as the solution offered by Jesus, was, as St. Paul says, "to the Greeks foolishness".

JOHN GOULD FLETCHER

LIFE BEFORE AND AFTER DEATH

[Modern and ancient views are to be found in two recent publications reviewed below. The former takes no cognizance of the doctrine of Reincarnation; the second deals with it from the standpoint of Buddhism. Next month we will publish an article on "Reincarnation" by Clifford Bax and also a study entitled "The Mind-Body Problem in relation to Human Survival," by Prof. K. R. Srinivasiengar.—EDS.]

I*

The moment is opportune for taking such a cross-section of current thought on the question of soul survival as is represented by this symposium, which originally appeared as a series in *The Spectator*. Within our generation, the defenders of Materialism have struck their colours

en masse; only a few invincibles, like Prof. G. Elliot Smith, still battle on against overwhelming odds. It is noteworthy that he alone of the seven contributors is as whole-hearted in his conviction that soul survival is a myth as Mr. Christopher Dawson is that the equally untenable after-death teachings

* *After Death? A Symposium*. Ed. by Dr. Edwyn Bevan. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London. 1s.)

of the Roman Church represent truth and fact. Surprisingly, these two base their respective attack and defence less upon soul survival than upon the resurrection of the body, a long-closed issue among thoughtful men.

All seven, however, exhibit, in varying degrees, the curiously circumscribed vision so characteristic of Western thought. They almost completely ignore the results of millenia of profound philosophic thought in the East. Otherwise, in the series we should find, surely, more than a single passing reference to reincarnation, which more to-day believe in than deny, and which is at least as philosophically tenable as the views here expressed. For the contemporary Western mind, what lies beyond the Caucasus deserves in truth the name of "undiscover'd country".

The next most striking feature of several of these views pro and con is the assumption that belief or disbelief is but hypothesis—in Dr. Bevan's phrase, "a personal conviction of which no cogent logical demonstration can be given". Implicit in this argument, and doubtless unsuspected by those who advance it, is arrogance. Between the lines is written: "We do not know;

we do not see how it is possible to know; therefore it is not possible to know; therefore none know." The validity of this syllogism rests on the omniscience of the writer, which none of these, we think, would claim.

Prof. J. Y. Simpson believes that it would be "supreme unwisdom" to deny on the basis of our incomplete and rapidly growing knowledge, and the President of the Society for Psychical Research points to the amply demonstrated, if occasional, power of the mind to "gain access to all sorts of knowledge beyond its conscious range. We are beginning to understand that each one of us is greater than he knows, that we are composite beings only feebly represented by our bodies." The Hon. Mrs. Alfred Lyttelton points also to—

the testimony of so many religions and great religious teachers . . . as evidence at least of the intuitions of mankind. Join these to the discoveries of psychology and psychical research and the cumulative effect on many minds seems irresistible.

Dr. L. P. Jacks has one end of the thread that would lead out of the maze of speculation in his conviction that the roots of belief in a future life lie "in the depths of the life-force which actuates us all".

PH. D.

II*

Not in any way interested in "eschatology" which term she detests as "absurd" (p. 17), Mrs. Rhys Davids is interested only in "anchistology," in the next step that is to be taken. In a delightful booklet, she has summed up the message of Gautama Buddha embodied in the earliest Pali Texts: life is a splendid opportunity to follow the path of Dharma with a view to the realization of the MORE in man. It affords, according to her, perhaps the most convincing and satisfactory answers to the eternal interrogations of earnest inquirers—Whence came we?

Whither go we? What ought we to do? Buddha's answer indicates "the life of the man as preceding this life on earth; this life as a moment, an opportunity to ensure a better next life" . . . (p. 87) She complains that this message of the Founder was completely lost in the monastic encrustations that had collected in the subsequent works and treatises. She claims that early Buddhism "had a distinctly New Mandate, a mandate eagerly welcomed when first given, but subsequently worsened and then virtually dropped" (p. 9).

If Mrs. Rhys Davids had confined

* *Indian Religion and Survival—A Study*. By Mrs. Rhys Davids, D.Litt., M.A., President Pali Text Society. (Allen and Unwin, London. 3s. 6d.)

herself to a reasoned demonstration of the normal excellence of an ancient Buddhistic Mandate that this life is to be viewed as an opportunity for the realization of the MORE in man and that the task of realization, incomplete in any given existence, indicates survival with the indispensable concomitant of "adjudication" and "awarding" (p. 18), she would have been entitled to unstinted gratitude. She however, accuses the Upanishads of silence about the "adjudication," "awarding," and of absence of "consistent theoretical unity" (p. 17). She accuses Dr. Radhakrishnan of having tripped in his treatment of Buddhism, and I may add of the Upanishads, the Gita, and the Brahma-Sutras as well; but has she not herself taken a false step?

An inaccurate citation from Dr. Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* (I, 115) and an examination of stray Upanishadic texts divorced from their contexts would hardly justify her arraignment. According to Indian tradition the Vedas relate to ritualistic programmes (कर्म कांड), and the Upanishads to metaphysical quest (ज्ञान कांड ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा). If Mrs. Rhys Davids desires to view the Vedantic tradition from the correct perspective, she should regard the Upanishads, the Gita, and the Brahma-Sutras forming a textual *tout ensemble*. She will find the elements of "adjudication" and "awarding" of man by man in the *tout ensemble*. If Mrs. Rhys Davids should seek to argue that, in the structure of Vedantic literature, a survival is a direct or indirect borrowing either from the early Buddhistic Pali Texts or from Zoroastrianism, it would be a matter of opinion which the students of the Vedanta are under no obligation to endorse. Borrowing or no borrowing, chronology or no chronology, the mandate contained in the "Dharma-Sutras" like that of Gautama, and in the "Mokshadharma Parva" of the Mahabharata shines forth with a splendour in no way inferior to that of the mandate embodied in the ancient Pali Texts. "Karma" as a consis-

tent doctrine is found in the *Brihad-aranyaka* :—

पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति । पापः पापेन ।

(By holy work verily a person becomes holy, unholy by unholy. III, 2, 13.)

Man's responsibility to fellowmen is indicated in the same Upanishad :—

यन्मनुष्यान्वासयते यदेभ्योऽज्ञानं ददाति ।

(He houses men and feeds them, etc.)

No doubt life is a splendid opportunity to realize the MORE and enable our fellowmen to realize the MORE likewise. But it is unintelligible why Mrs. Rhys Davids fights shy of the view that the values of life are to be transcended as misery-ridden. Every life, every existence, has in it the element of misery. Even the last birth in which atomic residue of the Karma-complex is finally shattered has the element of misery. The monastic ramification of later Buddhism must be right in its emphasis on the element of misery and on Nirvana as escape from it. The Upanishads have gone one step further. If man enjoys his birthright and right of way "in the worlds" (p. 89), disillusionment would surely dawn as these worlds are evanescent and perishing :—

तद्यथेह कर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयत एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यजितो लोकः क्षीयते.

(Just as in this world, the world obtained by means of actions perishes so also does perish the next world acquired by virtuous deeds.—*Chhandogya* VIII, 1,6).

The Upanishads indicate the goal of "freedom from transmigratory career" (अपुनरावृत्तिः).

My comments notwithstanding, I feel sure Mrs. Rhys Davids has earned the undying gratitude of students of Indian thought for the powerful vindication of the glory of the gospel of Buddha to whom, she rightly contends, a position of inferiority was assigned by W. Lutoslawski, though I for one cannot accept her view that the last word on the subject has been uttered by early Buddhism.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

MONADS OF LEIBNIZ

Leibniz (1643-1714) was a man of penetrating mind. His interests were as wide as they were certainly profound. He made his influence felt in many spheres, and in the varied roles of politician, historian, theologian, mathematician, physicist and philosopher his contributions have been of the highest importance. It is fair judgment to say that, with the possible exception of his invention of the calculus as an instrument of mathematical enquiry, it is in the field of philosophy that his influence has most largely endured. As subsequently systematised by Christian Wolf, his teachings not only dominated German philosophical thought for over a century, but also considerably influenced the subsequent trend both of the critical philosophy which followed it, and of the new ideas as to the fundamentals of such physical concepts as force and energy in the realms of pure science.

There is at the present time a very ambitious scheme, undertaken by the "Akademie der Wissenschaften" of Berlin, for the publication of a complete edition—in no less than forty volumes—of the works and papers of Leibniz. The plan, with but five volumes thus far issued, is still in its infancy. Until it is available, C. J. Gerhardt's edition in German remains the most comprehensive, and indeed supplies the main sources for Mary Morris's excellent translation now under review. It is pertinent to remark, however, that the main English commentators of recent years on Leibniz's philosophical writings are Bertrand Russell, in his *Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (1900), and Professor H. Wildon Carr's more recent *Leibniz* (1929). At the modest price of the Standard Everyman Edition, however, Mary Morris has now made available to all students familiar with the English tongue a compact and authoritative volume, every page of which

breathes care and discrimination in selection. The "meat" is there, and the reader need have no fear as to the omissions. The work is arranged in three Parts—the first giving in complete form the three essays ("The Monadology," "Principles of Nature and Grace," and "On the Ultimate Origination of Things") that best embrace the formal exposition of Leibniz's Philosophical System; Part II, gives, in the form mainly of various extracts from letters, the bulk of the amplifying evidence for Part I; and Part III is mainly of interest as giving us valuable glimpses of the man Leibniz behind the philosopher. To all this is prefaced a most able introduction, running to ten thousand words, by C. R. Morris, M.A.,—a well balanced and critical survey of the Leibnizian tenets of philosophy as set out in the translations that follow.

A quick word as to the personal setting of Leibniz is here advisable. He lived in the philosophical stream of the Cartesian School founded by Descartes (who had died when Leibniz was but seven years old), and he was contemporary with Spinoza and Locke. His philosophical duels were, in greater or lesser degree, fought with all these. Descartes, discussing the problem of doubt, came to the bedrock certainty of his own existence. "Cogito, ergo sum"—"I think, therefore I am," since to doubt he must think, and to think he must exist. But this existence was positive not in the bodily, but in the mental sense—the same difference as is implied between the statements "As sure as I stand here," and "As sure as I am now thinking". The certainty of Descartes was, however, in respect of a consciousness of self, limited, finite and imperfect, and therefore involving by implication also an idea of something unlimited, infinite and perfect.

Descartes essentially attempted his explanation of physical nature on a

* *The Philosophical Writings of Leibniz*. Selected and translated by MARY MORRIS. ("Everyman's Library," J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 2s.)

mathematical and mechanical basis. Natural, perhaps, that he should do so, having regard to the times in which he lived. (Galileo, for example, was a noted contemporary.) With Descartes there was a clear demarcation between mind and matter. Both to him were "substances" in that they existed on their own account, and could each be conceived only independent of the other. But for him "matter" was that which was extended (arising from a clear and distinct idea of extension apart from thinking), whilst "mind" was that which was conscious (arising from the idea of thinking apart from extension). It was the problem of the union of mind and matter in our own persons, therefore, that gave the Cartesian philosophers some trouble. This problem was worked out in terms of a mutual independence of each other, but of a common continual dependence upon God as the source of all existence. It was in fact the problem of "individuality," tackled on bolder lines by Spinoza, in one direction, and by Leibniz in another. Spinoza, however, continued to think in the tradition of the world of Galileo and Newton—the world of mechanics and physics. Distinctions between organisms and individuals find no place in the physicist's world. For him the truths of mathematics and mechanics are final and complete in themselves. The results are common property and the mere heritage of the historian of facts. But, and readers of THE ARYAN PATH will well appreciate the point, for the poet and the artist and the moralist this will not do. For him the utterances of the physicist or of anybody else cannot be divorced from the personality of the individual.

It was thus the problem of individuality that occupied Leibniz's mind. Definitely he could not see it in the physical atom, which, although physically indivisible, yet by virtue of its extension in space must have parts. And the same must apply in their turn to the "parts" also. Therefore real individuality, which for Leibniz demanded

a necessary real indivisible unity, cannot be found in the thing itself, but only in souls which have no extension in space. So Leibniz teaches that these "unities," or "monads," as he calls them, are the only realities, and that what is material or extended is but a phenomenon. There are monads which may *appear* to be things, because they *appear* to be extended. Actually they have the same kind of unity a soul has; and if they are not conscious of themselves, neither, after all, is a soul. If Descartes says, "I think, therefore I exist," Leibniz adds, "but when I am not thinking, as in sleep, my soul does not cease to exist". According to Leibniz, "little perceptions are going on in the soul even when we are not conscious"—(note here the forerunner of the modern doctrine of the "sub-conscious" in the science of psychology). So, therefore, the monads which make up the universe are not only, for instance, what our souls would be if we never reasoned, but also what our souls would be if we always slept, either with dreams or without. Similarly there are monads, or individualities, corresponding to the bodies of plants and animals, and even of bodies not ordinarily regarded as "living". All are of the same nature as, but differing in capacity from, the human soul. Further, no interaction is possible as between monad and monad, since each is a perfectly independent individuality and unity. Happenings are for each monad the outcome of its own nature. As Leibniz put it, "there are no windows by which anything can come in or go out." Yet if there is no interaction there is an interrelation—a "pre-established harmony" which produces an appearance of interaction which does not in fact exist. In man, for example, there is pre-established harmony between the highly developed "monad" which is his soul, and the many less highly developed monads which make up the body. Pre-established harmony leads therefore to the universal order chosen by God—the Supreme Monad—to give "the best possible of all worlds"

out of an infinite number of possibilities. This conclusion is reached by what Leibniz calls the "principle of sufficient reason"—a principle over and above the principles of mere logic and mathematics.

Such, all too briefly, is a summary of Leibniz's doctrine of the "Monad". Space unfortunately prevents a reference to the other aspects of Leibniz's philosophy and of its repercussions on modern physics and mechanics as brought out in this excellent little volume. But we would in conclusion direct the reader to a section of *The Secret Doctrine* (Vol. I, Part III, Chapter 15) by H. P. Blavatsky, entitled "Gods, Monads and Atoms" which traverses the field of "Monadology" from the special viewpoint of Theo-philosophy. The link with Leibniz is at once apparent from the following (p. 614):—

Neither esoteric philosophy, nor Kant, nor Leibniz would ever admit that extension can be

composed of simple or unextended parts. But theologian-philosophers will not grasp this.

And if Madame Blavatsky was not prepared to admit of Leibniz's teachings that they were wholly right, she at least goes more generously near to it than she does for any other Western philosopher. So she says (pp. 619, 620):—

It is well known that Leibniz came several times very near the truth, but defined monadic evolution incorrectly, which is not to be wondered at, since he was not an INITIATE, nor even a Mystic, only a very intuitional philosopher. Yet no psycho-physicist ever came nearer than he has to the esoteric general outline of evolution.

How near or how far the reader can decide for himself by first reading through Mary Morris's excellent little book, and then turning to the chapter from *The Secret Doctrine* here indicated, in which Leibniz is given a very fair and a very thorough consideration.

IVOR B. HART

Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind. By CHARLES WILLIAMS. (Oxford University Press. 6s.)

There is a memorable line of Milton's to which Mr. Charles Williams returns more than once in the course of his exploration of that schism in the soul of man which religion in the West has named "the Fall," but which he studies here in the expressive record of English poetry. It is the line in which Satan speaks of

Warring in heaven against heaven's matchless king.

The tragic paradox of man's rebellion against a Divine Will which can never be defeated is condensed into these seven words. Satan, to quote Mr. Williams, "has rebelled, in the name of freedom, against the central nature of freedom". He knows the futility of his act, knows that unless he can reconcile himself with heaven, there is nothing for him but an ever-deepening hell. But to be reconciled with heaven requires an acceptance of the nature of Love, and that

cannot be without a complete self-abandonment. But Satan is self. He has asserted his partial identity with such splendid daring against the pure identity of God. Is he to surrender, not merely his pride and ambition, but his rational independence and self-respect? His egoism cannot tolerate the thought. He will stand upon his rights. He will have his private freedom, but God who, as Love, is perfect freedom, must be subject to his conditions. And so all that he can do is to go on madly warring with heaven's matchless king. Hate which destroys itself must maintain its feud against the Love which can never be destroyed.

Thus in "the pitiless imagination of Milton," as Mr. Williams calls it, we see figured in its ultimate starkness the irrationality of man's rational disobedience. But there are many stages in that futile but necessary rebellion of a rational selfhood against the true Reason of our being. And in this book Mr. Williams delicately defines some of them as they are revealed by various

poets whether explicitly in actual dicta about poetry or implicitly in the very texture of their style.

A poet himself, he regards every true poem as a complete whole, and as a creation which has, in a real sense, a consciousness of its own which the reader must intimately experience. Consequently the pure nature of the poetry he studies does work on him immediately and what he discovers for us in it is, we feel, its essential meaning, passed through the analysing lens of his mind. There are times, perhaps, when he is superfluously subtle, but the depth and fineness of his insight is a constant satisfaction and the more so because he carries even into the abyss of reality a certain high gaiety of spirit.

He begins with Wordsworth's description of poetry as expressing passion, which itself "is highest reason in a soul sublime". And then, after a short chapter on the inexpressible quality of Beauty as Marlowe conceived it, he shows how, in Pope, Reason split up into discursive and intuitive reason, how Spenser sought to combine Reason and Beauty, but with too conscious and external a contriving, so that the truth which he allegorized into loveliness faded beneath the loveliness; how, in a different way, Keats, too, in his Odes to the Nightingale and Grecian Urn sought to leave the "dull brain" behind in order to be free to assert that beauty was truth, truth beauty, but how his genius in its integrity compelled him to recognise that he had evaded reality in a fancied luxury of death that was no death. And so to Milton and Shakespeare, in whom the dread schism of reason and desire, the awful reality of the disintegration of beauty and truth by which the one becomes a temptation, the other an intellectual lie, was expressed with a power and penetration unequalled elsewhere in

English poetry. In them Mr. Williams finds the complementary hemispheres of imagination. Milton has imagined a sublime Reason, which is both Truth and Beauty and also absolute Power, in control of the Universe and in relation to the contending and contradicting states of divided souls. Shakespeare has abandoned this supernal Reason and traced the conflict deeper and deeper until in some sense he has "imagined earth, under the influence of the operation of falsehood, ravaging upon itself". Over "Paradise Lost" the Creative Reason sits enthroned, in its uncreated purity. In "Lear" Unreason, violating the very sanctities of Nature, carries us into the abyss of destruction. The antithesis cannot be pushed too far. For there are Shakespeare's last plays to be considered. And Mr. Williams writes of the atonement which he expressed in them with sensitive understanding. It may be that "some new Augustan coolness," to quote his own words, "may have to rebuke the romantic heat" with which he explores the complex meaning of Shakespeare's tragedies. But he has read in him or into him, as he has, even more lucidly, in Milton's great epic, a spiritual drama of the highest significance. For here we are shown in and through the testimony of great poetry the reality of man's separation from the living universe, the loss of identity which goes with it and the devastation of reason as well as sensation, to which it ultimately leads. But Mr. Williams does not, like so many of his contemporaries, dethrone Reason because reason has usurped its place. For him Reason in its eternal purity is the chief faculty of the Soul and the poet fails to reconcile Beauty and Truth in his art, as we all do in our lives in the measure that we deny our real perceptions and "choose to know otherwise than in the duty and delight of love".

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

The Will to Fuller Life. By J. H. BADLEY. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London. 10s. 6d.)

This book is written by a headmaster for the benefit of boys and girls in their last year at school. It arose out of discussions with the pupils, and is a continuation of the author's previous book, *The Will to Live*. It has all the merits and limitations of a text-book for young people. But the pedagogic weaknesses of dwelling too long on the commonplace and the obvious, of repeating the same thing in several different ways and of dividing and sub-dividing and numbering the points to be driven home are more than redeemed by clear exposition, cogent reasoning, apt illustrations and above all by the serious and sane outlook on life throughout the discussion. The evident and acknowledged source of the teacher's inspiration is the emergent evolution of Professors Alexander and Lloyd Morgan.

From that point of view the creative urge that is responsible for the production of matter, life and mind is also responsible, at a higher level of being, for the so-called spiritual values of truth, beauty and goodness. The fullest manifestation of the will to live is the struggle towards a diviner life, of which these values are a foreshadowing and a pledge. They grow as man grows. They are different at different stages of the history of the race as well as of the individual. Mr. Badley has discussed in very simple language all the implications of truth, beauty and goodness as well as their origin, development and purpose. He has written a very persuasive book on a subject which vitally concerns us all.

The spiritual values of truth, beauty and moral goodness which have emerged at a certain level in the psychological evolution of man are not entirely unconnected with his animal instincts. It is not fanciful, says Mr. Badley, to regard the three kinds of spiritual good as being directly connected with

the three groups of human instincts—those of self-maintenance, of reproduction and of herd-life.

Thus the love of truth seems to be in direct connection with the first group of instincts; with that one in particular, curiosity, which impels us to learn all we can about our surroundings in order the better to deal with the situations in which we find ourselves. The love of beauty is no less closely connected with the reproductive instincts to which so much of the actual beauty of living things is due, and which have to do with creativity in all its forms. And if it be allowed that the 'ought' of moral activity is the outcome of social experience, the connection between moral good and the group-instinct is no less evident.

Fortunately this trend of thought proves no snare to us in the twentieth century, as it did to some nineteenth-century philosophers in England, who persisted in judging a tree by its roots and not by its fruits. We are not likely to be misled into thinking that evolution is working to merely biological ends and not spiritual ends. Love of truth, love of beauty and love of goodness may have had their origin in a biological necessity, but they attain their fullest development only when they are wholly dissociated from self-interest. Not only that. The hard and fast lines that we draw between them begin to fade away when the self is left behind. The highest values meet at the other end, interpenetrate one another and pass into the Great Unknown, of which all that we can say, according to the Hindu sage Yagnavalkya, is *neti, neti*—"not this, not this," not truth as we know it here, not beauty as we know it here and not righteousness as we know it here.

Thus all paths lead to religion, as all values inhere in God. Therefore the teaching on the Will to fuller life cannot be complete without a chapter on religion. But the author says that this subject has been left for separate treatment. We hope his future book on religion will be as cogent and convincing as the present one on the implications of science, art and morality.

D. S. SARMA

Theological Existence To-day! By KARL BARTH, trans. by R. BIRCH HOYLE. (Hodder and Stoughton, London. 2s.)

Christ Himself was eclipsed, in the West, when the Western Church herself distorted the image of Christ, changing herself from a Church into a Roman State, and again incarnating the State in the form of the Papacy. Yes, in the West, Christianity and the Church truly exist no longer, though there are still many Christians, nor will they ever disappear. Catholicism is truly Christianity no longer; it degenerates into idolatry, and Protestantism with giant strides runs down the steep into Atheism.

Dostoevsky wrote those sentences a year or two before he died in 1881. Could he see Europe to-day, he would be forced to believe that the State has swallowed the remains of the Church—and that therefore we have reached the end-term of Lutherism. Everything in this book, which reveals the degradation of the German Church, compels that belief—except the courage and integrity of its author.

The present régime in Germany has been defined as a "sergeant-major civilization". The State is absolute. That is, temporal power—and only temporal power—is worshipped. As an inevitable consequence, the German Church has become the slave of the German State. It is necessary to cite only a few of the facts given by Dr. Barth in order to show the extent of that servitude.

Army-Chaplain Mueller is *Reichs*-bishop, and is therefore the spiritual leader of Germany. He was appointed despite Church protest, and von Hindenburg's expression of sympathy with that protest. He is Hitler's nominee, and has the support of the "German Christians". As these latter also control the Central Church Press Bureau in Berlin, their doctrines are dominant in Germany to-day.

Summarized, these doctrines are as follow:—

1. The Church has to prove herself to be the Church for the German people.

2. She must help the people to understand and fulfil the vocation entrusted

ed to her by God, as this is the ultimate purpose of the present government.

3. The acknowledgment of the majesty of the National Socialist Government is not only a matter of citizenship, but also a matter of religious belief.

4. The Gospel in future must be preached as the Gospel of the Third Reich.

5. The Credal confession must be expanded in the sense of a fierce attack against Mammonism, Bolshevism, and anti-Christian Pacifism.

6. The *Reichs*-bishop is the spiritual leader who is personally responsible for the ruling decisions.

Now, all of that comes to this:—Render unto Cæsar the things that are God's. Any attempt to attain Christ's stature is abandoned. Christ is to be reduced to the level of men. He is to doff his seamless coat and don a Brown Shirt. Well, that is "war-time christianity"—and we in England have known it, and the horror of it.

Those are the doctrines of the "German Christians". Dr. Krause—recently elected to the Synod Council at a meeting of the Brandenburg Synod of the Evangelical Church—is more explicit. Recently, he stated:—

It is an impossible idea that one can acknowledge the Third Reich and yet obey God more than man. We must return to a native scheme of values, retaining as much of Christianity as will stand this new test.

And Dr. Barth's answer to all this? His answer is—No! It is a magnificent and a courageous answer. The reasons for his refusal to accept "German Christian" doctrines are given on pages 50 to 53. It is essential, however, to quote in full one of those reasons here.

The fellowship of those belonging to the Church is not determined by blood, therefore not by race, but by the Holy Spirit and Baptism. If the German Evangelical Church excludes Jewish-Christians, or treats them as of a lower grade, she ceases to be a Christian Church.

But Dr. Barth's book—which must be read from cover to cover by those who wish to know the present position

of the Church in Germany—raises by implication a question greater than any actually discussed in its pages. It is this. What inner failure has made this degradation of the Church possible? It is not persecution. Persecution does not degrade a living Church any more than danger paralyses a living nation. Greatness is always greatly opposed—and grows greater as a result of opposition. What, then, is that inner surrender which (in an institution as in an individual) is the forerunner of degradation? Dr. Barth holds that "Where the Church is a Church, she is already delivered". And, if she is a Church no longer, what has deserted her that she stands defenceless?

A living Church represents man's belief that he has a supernatural environment as well as a natural one. The Church exists to minister to his eternal welfare; the State to his tempo-

ral. To the former, man is a soul. To the latter, he is a citizen.

In fact, the institutions of Church and State—the compromises and the conflicts between them—are projections on a mighty stage of the individual's response to the claims of his dual environment. Where the supernatural, the eternal is venerated—the Church is mighty. Where the natural, the temporary, is worshipped—the State is mighty.

Once a Church ceases to be the temple and the symbol of man's belief in the eternal, she is no longer a Church. She is a ruin, misty with memories. And so soon as man believes that temporal power is the one reality, the State becomes absolute. Life is no longer conceived as a pilgrimage, but as a battle.

Men get the Church, and the Government, that they desire—and therefore deserve.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

The Indian Theatre. By R. K. YAJNIK M. A., PH. D. (Allen & Unwin Ltd., London. 10s.)

Dr. Yajnik has written an excellent survey of the Indian drama from the golden age of Kalidasa to its decline after the Mohammedan conquest and its revival under British influence. He deals with the classical period and the medieval popular stage, not with the idea of writing exhaustively on these phases of dramaturgy but rather as a background to what followed in 1756 when India had her first British theatre in Calcutta. The writer is singularly qualified to deal with the Indian drama to-day, for he obtained first-hand knowledge after a long tour of important theatres in India, a tour which included the study of MS. copies of various plays and the perusal of the diary of an eminent producer. Dr. Yajnik seems to think that "it is as great a reward of scholarship to appreciate the deep unity in apparent diversity, as it is to enjoy the subtle distinctions between the arts and literatures of diverse nationalities at

various stages of their evolution". In no carping spirit I venture to think that the author stresses unity in Indian and European drama a little too readily. The differences are quite as marked. It is true Shakespeare deeply impressed India. No less than twenty-nine of his plays were translated and adapted, though not all staged in that country. It was not Shakespeare in modern clothes, as we had him in London, but Shakespeare made to fit into the rich heritage of the Indian stage. Dr. Yajnik realises the unfortunate influence of the cinema in India, and is aware of the popular craving for scenic effect on the stage. Crude imitation has naturally failed. What is wanted is "a thoroughly Indian Ibsen or Shaw who would tackle contemporary problems with the earnestness and artistic appeal of those writers". Although Dr. Yajnik sees in the Indian theatre to-day "a state of utter confusion," he is also aware of signs of hope, an approach to a period of "self-unfolding".

HADLAND DAVIS

John Galsworthy: By HERMON OULD. (Chapman and Hall Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

William Morris. By PAUL BLOOMFIELD BARKER (Arthur Barker Ltd., London. 10s.)

"There are not enough lovers of beauty among men. It all comes back to that." Thus wrote John Galsworthy in *The Burning Spear* just after the War. There are not enough lovers of beauty in the world. It all comes back to that—is a sentiment which William Morris, whose name is more closely associated with the word Beauty than that of any other Englishman, would not have uttered. He imagined that love of beauty is innate in all men, and he gave his life in the endeavour so to change the social scene that all men would enjoy beauty and produce it. The illusion that men are better than they are is what made Morris a great force. The knowledge of what men are made Galsworthy a great novelist.

Mr. Hermon Ould has performed a very friendly and self-effacing task in writing this book. It amounts to a general cracking up of all Galsworthy, providing a sort of anthology of his work, mercifully unburdened by quotation marks and dots. It puts us in a position to look at Galsworthy as if we were in the auditorium of a cinema being shown in rapid succession all the facets of his work. The author takes exception to the prevalent idea that Galsworthy was the typical Englishman, on the ground that he attacked the foundations of society. I do not follow him. One of the chief English traits is that of self-criticism. Galsworthy was typically English—never more so than in his innate decency, charity, stiffness, tightness, uprightness, pity for animals, sedate shyness, love of fair play, ignorance of philosophy, and blindness to the meaning of religion as opposed to creeds. On a subject such as Immortality we can only expect from him absolute clichés about "merging" and indirect digs at "those Yogi chaps in India". But he could go deep when not realis-

ing it, far deeper than Morris was capable of. In "The Inn of Tranquillity" we read:—

... Suddenly I was visited by a sensation only to be described as a sort of smiling certainty, emanating from, and, as it were, still tingling with every nerve of myself, but vibrating harmoniously with the world around. It was as if I had suddenly seen what was the truth of things, not perhaps to anybody else, but at all events to me... "Yes," I thought, "he and I and those olive-trees, and this spider on my hand, and everything in the Universe which has an individual shape, are all fit expressions of the separate moods of a great underlying Mood or Principle, which must be perfectly adjusted, revolving and revolving on itself. For if it did not volve and revolve on itself, it would peter out at one end or the other, and the image of this petering out no man with his mental apparatus can conceive."

Galsworthy was too typically English to suspect that this was philosophy—and the *only* philosophy. But he uttered it. William Morris was no seer. Mr. Paul Bloomfield has written a very likeable account of this many-sided man. He has obviously got a lot out of Morris and is so fond of him that he is inclined to think him always in the right. However, the reader is given ample opportunity to draw his own conclusions. Morris was not supreme in any one form of expression. He was supreme as an all-round man—and that is as good an achievement as excelling in one thing. He was poet, prose-writer, decorator, architect, painter, printer, lecturer, sociologist. There is no use pretending that he was a good poet, for he only wrote easy verse, or a remarkable prose writer, for in that form he lacked muscle to the extent of making his *Tales* unreadable, though in *The Dream of John Ball* and in *News From Nowhere* he does reach at times the beauty of expression which only his style could attain. And as he refused to countenance the new birth, industrialism, in any degree whatever, his decorative work, the furniture, stained glass, tapestries, wall-papers, carpets modelled on an old birth, were out of touch with the historic moment and hence only of museum value. All this

escapes Mr. Bloomfield who calls him a great *wise* man. William Morris was not wise. There are not two or three ways of being wise: there is only one—that of facing reality. A man with Morris's immense force of life might have changed the course of industrialism before it was too late. But he preferred to talk of reviving the Middle Ages, which somehow does not sound quite so ridiculous as attempting to revive Athenian or Roman life, but belongs nevertheless to the same order of thought. Morris was idealistic about Beauty: Mr. Bloomfield does not see that, but what he does see from the beginning of his book to the end, is that Morris was absolutely realistic about ugliness. He knew that life was made ugly for most people, and this hurt him so much that he gave a moral force to the Socialist movement that is still felt. He gave a lot of material help to the cause in financing it, in acting as editor, newspaper boy, lecturer, song-writer; but it was his moral weight that still tells. He said that fellowship is heaven and that lack of fellowship is hell. I have suggested that he was not supreme in anything. But in that active fellowship which is heavenly he was supreme, and in the supreme decency of this

great man we may hope to see the most typical English trait. Once at a public meeting a professional heckler asked him—

"Does Comrade Morris accept Karl Marx's theory of value?" Comrade Morris answered: "I am asked if I believe in Marx's theory of value. To speak quite frankly, I do not know what Marx's theory of value is, and I'm damned if I want to know."

Nor do we know what that theory is. But we do know what the facts are; and it is to the English Morris rather than to Marx that we must look for the moral force to overcome them.

But as regards final English typicality let us remember that Morris was prepared to make a spectacle of himself in the street selling pamphlets and getting moved on by policemen. And let us remember that Galsworthy spent his life in showing up the injustice of the rich towards the poor, and in pouring upon the latter an ocean of pity; but the only political action he was ever known to take was when he came up from the country in 1931 especially to vote for the Prime Minister who was exchanging the cloak of socialism for that of conservatism. A reviewer is not called upon to decide whether the action of Morris or of Galsworthy is representative of the English genius.

J. S. COLLIS

The Transformation of Nature in Art. By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY. (Harvard University Press. \$ 3.00. Humphrey Milford, London. 12s. 6d.)

This book, besides being an invaluable study of Oriental æsthetic theory, offers a basis "for a general theory of art co-ordinating Eastern and Western points of view". Until the Renaissance the Christian art of the West corresponded in essentials with the art of India and China; and an illuminating exposition of the dicta of Meister Eckhart is given in support of this. The Asiatic response to art is described as being predominantly intellectual, "a delight of the reason," the work of art itself being "the stimulus to the release

of the spirit from all inhibitions of vision," or what Eckhart called "the vision of the world-picture as God sees it... intellectually and not merely sensibly". Again, the deeper implication of this æsthetic theory—namely, that "life itself—the different ways in which the difficult problems of human association have been solved—represents the ultimate and chief of the arts of Asia"—is echoed by Eckhart in so far as he regarded the artist "not as a special kind of man, but every man as a special kind of artist"—that is, faced with his own particular problem of human association.

Unfortunately, however, the fact that both Asiatic and Christian art are

conformist, conservative and rigidly orthodox is likely to alienate even the most sympathetic Westerner to-day—who could not be reassured by Mr. Coomaraswamy's rather enigmatic assertion that "orthodoxy, for the East, is determined by what a man does, and not by his beliefs," when the whole purport of the book is an uncompromising rejection of the empiricism which that one isolated sentence would seem to imply. For the Westerner, the strength of virtually all post-Renaissance European art lies in its empirical nature. The Renaissance itself was an emphatic declaration that man could no longer abide by prescribed theories: a widening divergence was apparent between the intellectual apprehension of God and the manifestation of his being in man's nature. Man could no longer conform to a pattern of which he did not feel himself to be an organic part; it became necessary for him to "prove life upon his pulses"; and if all life was good, if "God's idiosyncrasy was being," then it was incumbent upon man to explore his own unplumbed potentialities that he might know God as a reality rather than as a hypothesis. And it is impossible for the modern Westerner to go back upon that gesture of the Renaissance; his humanism may have led him into some queer paradoxes, but fundamentally he knows that the way of truth is always hard, a continual process of trial and error; he knows, too, that in the realm of art to repudiate the religious fervour of a Beethoven or the passionate quest of a

Keats—whose life was like a steadfast flame in which the dross of falsehood was consumed, leaving only the Real, the True and the Beautiful in their inevitable unity—would indeed be to sell his birthright.

Nevertheless, we feel that an understanding between East and West is already much nearer than Mr. Coomaraswamy would imagine. For, once we have accepted that first racial difference wherein the nature of Eastern genius might be said to be abstract and that of the Western concrete, there remain many points of contact. The more responsible kind of Western criticism to-day very definitely asserts that naturalism is not art, that substance and form must be interdependent and indivisible; while realism is relegated to the category of mere inartistic *fact*, simply because it is a mode of expression in which Nature is not transformed, by the artist's subtle and individual craftsmanship, into a revelation of artistic *truth*, or ultimate reality. Surely, then, the implications of such an attitude are concomitant with Mr. Coomaraswamy's description of a work of art (that is, "a stimulus to the release of the spirit from all inhibitions of vision"); and is it not true that, while the Eastern artist works in the freedom of a formal tradition and the Westerner in the tyranny of a freedom in which he must perforce be his own arbiter, the goal of each is identical—namely, that universal spiritual truth which alone, in the last resort, can traverse the barriers of race and creed?

J. P. HOGAN

Clerambault, or One Against All. By ROMAIN ROLLAND. Trans. from the French. (Jackson, Wylie and Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

Man is a product of the social and economic conditions under which he lives. Like every other animal, he owes his character to his environment: he does not spring fully-armed from the mind of Jove with power to bestride the earth like a Colossus. He is

dependent upon his surroundings, human as well as physical. His whole nature is deeply dyed to the colour of the life obtaining in that part of the world to which he belongs by birth and tradition. He is a gregarious animal whose individuality is a product of his social relations. He is, in fact, part of the social organism, and until he recognises himself as such he cannot see himself for egotism.

This being so, the theoretical problem of pacifism, with which this novel deals, is far more difficult and complex than they can understand who lay claim to a childish individualism. To the child, peace or war is rightly a matter of personal inclination since he can have little or no objective appreciation of society; but the case is far other with a grown person. In order to be an intelligent pacifist a man must first be an intelligent nationalist. What that implies is a bone of great contention; but since it is indisputable that we are as purposefully born into nations as we are born into families, we cannot claim to be citizens of the world merely by espousing the sentiment of formless internationalism. A beggar might as plausibly lay claim to all wealth. Willy-nilly each one of us draws his life's blood from the body of his own national organism, and if the blood of that organism is enfeebled or becomes infected, in vain does the individual disown the infection. Therefore the individual pacifist who prides himself upon his pacifism is merely one who does not understand his place in the body corporate—one who meanly propounds the question "Who is my neighbour?" Merely to disclaim the inherited vices of the community to which we belong does not free us from them. So when the individual pacifist claims his pacifism as a virtue, the claim is specious. It is a claim to isolation from the life of the community, a claim to privilege, and virtue based on privilege is merely parasitic.

Hence the unbearable conflict which went on in the mind of every intelligent man who was required to bear arms in the late war. Society and tradition enforced that which humanity and religion forbade. The dilemma presented itself finally in some such form as this: Am I to outrage those susceptibilities which distinguish me from the beast because I realise that I am part of the organism whose activities in the last issue involve this outrage; or, am I, in the name of humanity, illogically to disown the corporate life to which I

belong, and to inhibit in myself an activity now manifestly become destructive? And to the question thus presented I confess that I, personally, could find no answer that offered a true dialectical resolution. Yet an answer had to be found; the necessity for action demanded it.

As always in such dilemmas the only valid appeal was from theory to practice, from the question to the questioner; for it is in himself as an organism, and not merely as an intellect, that the true answer lies. Therefore in my experience, when I appealed from the complexity of thought to the simplicity of action, it was to enquire: Are you *in your totality* able to do those things which war requires of you? And to that there was but one reply: a final and irrevocable no, which dispelled all questions of choice.

Yet this absolute conclusion was at once personally humiliating and spiritually enfranchising. To be incapable of solving the matter intellectually and thus to be driven back upon the simple fiat of consciousness was victory in defeat. I was humiliated to find myself a "Defeatist," a "Conscientious Objector". To break faith with the past was death to personal pride. But the casting away of arms amid the ruins of one's own making brought with it the sense of resurrection to unity with the emergent purpose of life. Self-concern ceased. Whatever the issue, it lay with that life which only required one's obedience.

I have stated the case for complexity at this perhaps inordinate length precisely because I feel that Romain Rolland's novel does it scant justice and that his advocacy of pacifism upon the basis of entirely virtuous individualism, however eloquent, plays straight into the hands of opposing counsel. "One against all" is far too simple; for if the individual is to be set over against "the mob" in everlasting opposition, then the redemption of the world is a fond daydream of self-indulgent superiority. In *Clerambault* the individual is set over against society in the

terms of vice against virtue. Clerambault himself is described as "a good idealist," "on the whole a good poet and good man, intelligent and somewhat foolish, pure in heart and feeble in character," a description which really denies him the right to the prophetic mantle with which he is disguised. He is awakened from his complacent dream of peace to the "engulfment of the individual soul in the abyss of the multitude soul," and the contrast between these impossible antitheses is maintained as a fundamental law of human ethics. One can only remember, in mitigation of this false simplicity, that the book was written while the War was actually in progress, when an emotional rather than a philosophic treatment of the subject was natural.

The Horizons of Thought: A Study in the Dualities of Thinking. By G. P. CONGER, Ph. D. (Princeton University Press. \$ 5.).

This is a companion volume to the author's earlier book *A World of Epitomizations*. It sets forth the epistemological presuppositions of the latter, namely, that perception and thinking are implicitly dual:—

When we think of the universe or any of its parts, our thinking.....proceeds as perception does, by selection and at the same time by a correlative neglect.

What we select, we are said to treat denotatively or connotatively, *i. e.*, either by mere designation or by characterisation. What we neglect forms the background of what we select. This neglected field transcends our actual knowledge. It is what we are necessarily ignorant about, and have to leave indeterminate. Our treatment of it is designated by the author as enotation and innotation to correspond respectively to the two forms of actual knowledge. The author thinks that—many difficulties in classical and contemporary philosophy are due to mistaken attempts to treat neglected...backgrounds, which are beyond the horizons of our thinking, as if they were, or in any ultimate sense could be made, parts of its selected....content,

Here it has been productive of a sentiment and rhetoric quite unworthy of its famous author. Moreover the anonymous translator has done almost his worst, ignoring the English idiom and constantly perpetrating such sentences as this:—

They were proud of him [*i.e.*, Clerambault] as if he had been their work. What one admires is somewhat as if one had created it. And when, in addition, one is part of the being admired, when one is of the same blood, one no longer distinguishes very well up to what point one comes from him, or if it is he who comes from you.

So that, on the whole, it seems to have been hardly worth while making an English translation of a work, completed seventeen years ago, which was, when it was written, little more than a humanitarian gesture.

MAX PLOWMAN

The author examines in Part I some dualities, nine in all, involved in perception and thinking. He then enters into a study of most of the current problems in logic, mathematics, ontology and cosmology and freedom and values, and considers each problem under five heads. Under A, he defines his subject. He considers, under B, what he calls inadequate and questionable treatments which approach the traditional problems by way of certain psychological and epistemological theories, such as skepticism, realism-idealism, intuitionism, etc. Under C, he considers those treatments of problems which are in terms of other problems without seeing, as he thinks, "that the answer in terms of the second topic really involves the same formal principles and horizons, in short the same problems of duality, under another name". The third class of mistaken ways of dealing with the problems involving dualities, is dealt with under D. Here he examines certain unwarranted descriptive statements, affirmative, negative, alternative (either-or), antinomial (but-and), and nihilistic (neither-nor), which according to him point beyond the horizons but do not point to anything definitely descriptive there.

The mistake is like running a football out

of bounds and expecting to continue the game.

Lastly, he considers, under E, the nine dualities as they are applicable to every problem within his six realms of logic, number, geometry-kinematics, matter, life and mind, which according to him "are in transitive relationships of inclusion, or 'container and contained'."

His conclusion is:—

The cosmos which we are able to apprehend in perception and comprehend in thought is an island, and all around it is an ocean of the unknown.....Our island or continent of the cosmos invites exploration, cultivation, and perhaps even *settlement*. Traditionally we have looked too much to the enotative, the transcendent, for our grounds and sanctions. The task of metaphysics is to explore our island-continent; the task of philosophy, of religion and of ethics is to show what are the conditions of our settling down and being at home in it.

There will be general sympathy, if not whole-hearted agreement, with the author's view that all our knowledge at whatever level implies an indeterminate field of which we remain necessarily ignorant. The existence of the indeterminate in some sense is forced upon our thought. To think is to prescribe limits, and everything beyond these limits is perforce to be left undefined. But evidently, once we have admitted this necessary limitation of our knowledge, we cannot leave it there. It is just where metaphysics ought to begin and not, as the author thinks, to stop. It is the business of the sciences to explore the field of our actual knowledge, the island-continent as our author calls it. It is the business of metaphysics to venture out into the transcendent and to try to take a whole view of things. This it can only succeed in doing when it ceases to put too much reliance upon ordinary logic, and evolves a new logic that will be hand-maid to those intuitions of reality that, in the words of William James, "come from a deeper level of our nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits". The author is shy about put-

ting "reliance upon intuition as a way of synthesizing and reconciling the oppositions of thinking". But either these oppositions are reconcilable or they are not. If they are, we must somehow rise above thought, and endorse Hocking, for whom—

the ultimate evidence for the selfhood of the whole is not primarily the evidence of argument, nor of analogy, but immediate experience interpreted by dialectic.

If they are not, metaphysics is not possible, and there is little mental satisfaction in the study of—

some principles according to which thinking is limited to various horizons, and some principles whereby intuitions afford us a formal confidence and resolute grasp when we try to carry our connotative knowledge into the enotative future.

The author shows wide acquaintance with the present day writers on logical, scientific and philosophical subjects. His references to them are very copious. But unfortunately his treatment of the different topics, which comprise a very wide range, is not very satisfactory. It is scrappy and disconnected; there is no consistent working out of any topic from a single point of view. This entails much distraction on the part of the reader who has to pass in rather rapid review all possible forms under which a subject may be approached or talked about. The book contains much information and many useful suggestions, but no solutions of philosophical problems. If anything, the author's conclusion would seem to be wholly negative. He does not give us a new method of tackling problems of philosophy, but simply shows the limitations of all possible knowledge with the implication that we must have the transcendent alone and remain satisfied with the connotatively known finite universe. But the truth is that the finite cannot be properly understood without reference to the Infinite. The Infinite alone is the true Reality, knowing which, as the Upanishads say, "all else is known".

G. R. MALKANI

Encyclopædia of Psychic Science. By NANDOR FODOR LL.D., with Preface by Sir Oliver Lodge, O.M. (Arthurs Press Ltd., London.)

Psychic Science, as defined by Dr. Fodor in his Introduction, "embraces both psychical research and spiritualism" which are "purely empirical and merge into orthodox science". Within the limits of this definition Dr. Fodor has collected, summarised, and arranged a vast amount of information. His book contains no less than 832 closely printed columns, and the Index shows that about 900 different subjects are dealt with. Most of the more important topics in psychical research and spiritualism receive full and generally satisfactory treatment; the leading authorities on each are quoted or referred to, and bibliographies are appended. Among the other subject-headings appear the names of writers, experimenters, mediums, societies, and periodicals. One gathers that the author himself is inclined to the spiritualist point of view but in most cases, where either the reality or the explanation of the phenomena is disputed, he adopts a judicial attitude and quotes from both sides.

Dr. Fodor dismisses "occultism," "theosophy," and "mysticism" all in some twenty-five lines, and thereby—some of us will think—makes his work much less useful than it might otherwise have been. The explanations of psychic phenomena, put forward by H. P. Blavatsky in the 1870's and 1880's, are sufficiently weighty to deserve mention in an encyclopædia of the subject. What she said, for example, about the part played by the astral body of the medium in materialisations and other séance room phenomena has been confirmed by the recent re-discovery of ectoplasm; but the still more significant theory of "shells" has been studiously ignored by psychical researchers and spiritualists alike, although it supplies a consistent and logical *via media* between the conflicting theories of those who attribute all the phenomena to "spirits" and those who deny that ex-carnate agencies have anything to

do with them. Dr. Fodor's article on Madame Blavatsky is almost entirely taken from hostile sources, notably Dr. Richard Hodgson's report to the Society for Psychical Research; and although he includes Mr. W. Kingsland's overwhelming criticism of Hodgson in his bibliography, Dr. Fodor shows no sign of having read it nor indeed any other statement of Madame Blavatsky's side of the case. In fact his interest in her is limited to the psychic phenomena, with which she was associated, and these he condemns merely because they were condemned by Hodgson who, it must always be remembered, did not himself see nor investigate any single one of them, but based his verdict on the tainted evidence of people who received money from the Madras missionaries for their testimony against Madame Blavatsky. We trust that Dr. Fodor, who does not usually display bias, will revise this very one-sided and unfair article when preparing the second edition of his book.

It is probably inevitable in a work covering so wide a field that some subjects should be given too much space and others too little. For example under *Spheres* we are given a long summary of the statements of various mediums the value of which may be gauged from Dr. Fodor's remark that "every trance information asserts something different". While, on the other hand, the enormously important subject of *Time* receives only the briefest of treatment. Mr. J. W. Dunne's deeply interesting book, *An Experiment with Time* is casually referred to under the heading "Dreams," but is not mentioned at all under "Time" nor under the author's name.

But, while the *Encyclopædia of Psychic Science* is open to criticism in some of its details, the work as a whole has been excellently constructed, and promises to be most valuable to all students of abnormal psychology, spiritualism, psychical research, and occult phenomena.

R. A. V. M.

The Eclipse of Christianity in Asia. By LAWRENCE E. BROWNE, B. D. (Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.)

The author of this interesting book has set himself to trace the history of Christianity in Western Asia during the first eight centuries of Islamic domination. By confining his view strictly to Asia, he has excluded from his survey Constantinople which, for the largest community of Asiatic Christians, was the sun and centre of the universe throughout the period. The Armenian and Georgian national Churches, though of great historical importance, come in only incidentally, while many interesting local sects—e. g., the Maronites—receive no mention; so that it is the history of the Nestorian and Jacobite (Syrian) Churches which he is really tracing, and with these he would appear to have some modern personal acquaintance, though he does not say so. From first to last the attention of the reader is focused upon Mesopotamia, which was in fact the heart of Asia in those days. The work is the result of study in an unfrequented field, and also of much thought. If Dr. Browne lets off the Christians at the time of the Islamic Conquest lightly in his judgment, he does not hide the virtues of the Muslim conquerors; he makes it clear that Muslim intolerance of Christians was very largely the result of the Crusades and, though his information on Islam has largely been derived from definitely hostile sources, he repeats no calumnies, and has one pair of scales alike for Christians and for Muslims.

For all who care to know something of the history, conduct and ways of thought of those Churches, anathematised by the Orthodox of East and West as heretical, which were "preserved within the structure of the Muslim Empire as toads have been preserved alive in rock" (the simile is more striking than accurate as Dr. Browne's readers will learn), this book provides a wealth of information not to be attained elsewhere without profound research; and also a civilised general view of

a period of history which has been the subject of much controversy. Particularly interesting are the chapters entitled "Polemic" and "Christianity under the Mongols," each of which I hope the author will expand some day into a volume. Comparatively few people know that the Christians of Mesopotamia enjoyed a brief spell of triumph after Hulaku had taken Baghdad and, as has always happened in the history of the Eastern Churches, they abused their triumph with disastrous consequences to themselves.

The author seems to have a prejudice against the Turks, for on p. 139 we read "Mahmud of Ghazna, *Turk though he was* (my italics), was a great patron of learning." The historical truth is that, wherever Turks have risen to imperial power, whether at Ghazna, Delhi or Constantinople, they have been among the greatest patrons of learning, art and genius that the world has known. Even the little Seljûq sultanates of Asia Minor were renowned for such patronage. Dr. Browne ascribes the ultimate conversion of the Mongol Emperors to Islam instead of Christianity entirely to a materialistic view of the uses of religion, and he may be right in this particular instance. But he seems to us to take it a little too calmly for granted that the triumph of Islam was always due to people's awe of overwhelming military power and never to an appeal of the religion to men's hearts and minds. One feels that, as an ardent Trinitarian, he is always at a loss to imagine how anyone can prefer Unitarianism, and is apt to look upon the Unitarian as a person of inferior intellectual (or it may be spiritual) status and defective mental outfit, which seems not quite fair. In both communities are to be found those who take a materialistic or political view of their religion and also those whose faith is based on spiritual experience, and the experience which Dr. Browne would call "conversion" is quite as common among Muslims as among Christians; nor do the metaphysical and the ethic of the two religions

appear to me to differ half so radically as he thinks. On p. 181 he has written :—

Perhaps it may sound premature to speak of the fall of Islam when there are still many millions of Muslims in the world, but culturally Islam was a spent force by the fifteenth century.

I would rather say that culturally the predominances of East and West have alternated pretty regularly for the last three thousand years, and are likely to go on alternating. The present power of Christendom (if one may still apply the term to something which is anything but Christian) seems to have reached its zenith and to be threatened with destruction from within; while the culture of Christendom, in which Islam has no small share, is reinvigorating the East without absorbing it. It

seems to us that these phenomena differ not at all from those which marked the day of triumph of Islam. The cause of the decline and fall of Islamic world-power was a strangling growth of scholasticism comparable to the ecclesiasticism which kept Christendom backward in the old days which Dr. Browne so well describes. The Muslims now are casting off that yoke; and, if our author's theory with regard to its propagation in the old days is correct, Islam has never before had such an opportunity of proving its worth as a religion as it has to-day.

The author's personal views are as interesting as the fruits of his ripe scholarship though in a different way. The book is furnished with a bibliography and an index.

MARMADUKE PICKTHALL

Hypnosis and Suggestion. By WILLIAM F. LOVATT, C.S.M.M., G.B.P.A. (Rider and Co., London. 2s. 6d.)

The author studied on and off for six years before attempting any practical work of healing, and, in his Foreword says: "I feel thankful for this God-sent gift and to know that I can be of some service to humanity". But sound motive, unfortunately, does not necessarily imply sound knowledge. He states that the various conflicting theories of hypnotism lead nowhere—which is true—but he rashly goes on to imply that the practice can be safely undertaken, irrespective of the theory held. This fallacy probably accounts for his faulty propositions about the innocuous character of hypnotism, propositions that are contradicted by the very cases he records. To take only one obvious example, compare these two extracts:—

(1) The subject can only be put to sleep and suggestions given as long as he is willing to do so. (p. 29).

(2) ... I was giving a demonstration. One of the spectators declared that no one would

ever be able to have any influence over him, etc. ... I said nothing to him for the time being, but after he had seen two other subjects quickly put to sleep, I suddenly turned to him and gave him a command to close his eyes. He did so at once. "Now you can't open them," I suggested firmly. He couldn't in spite of trying hard. To day he is a very good and willing subject. (pp. 21-2).

What the author cites as an argument in favour of the process, namely, that many subjects respond to suggestion without needing to be put to sleep, merely proves that many people have so far lost their human birth-right of conscious free-will that they are ordinarily in a semi-hypnotic condition. The man in the street does well to beware, even though mesmerism is potent for good as for evil. For those who have studied the subject thoroughly from the inner point of view, hold that its practice and instruction should be most stringently restricted, since there are very few people who are inherently fitted, intellectually and morally, to use that power with true discrimination.

W. E. W.

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

[A. E. Waite is well-known for his many valuable books—veritable flames of old knowledge which are worth an exchange with more than one modern bulb. Every quarter he will give to our readers the benefit of his researches and reading of the many periodicals containing matter of interest.—EDS.]

It is now some time since Sir Oliver Lodge spoke over the wireless, in one of a series of talks on the importance of Psychical Research, and gave his considered answer to an allotted question: Do We Survive? Under any circumstances, that answer would call for notice in looking back on the psychical events of the last three months; but it is especially important to see how we stand regarding it, because at least one spiritist periodical has termed it in bold headlines a "clear and convincing answer to an age-old question".* It was not put forward as such and does not correspond to the description, except in the unchallengeable sense that it bears unfailing testimony to the speaker's utter sincerity. Knowing Lodge as we all do, respecting and loving him as we must, it would be impertinent to insist hereon. The discourse is otherwise, in all simplicity, an explanation and defence of a personal faith, as the following summary shews. A study of the evidence for some fifty years has assured Sir Oliver Lodge (1) that we are not "limited to the physical body," or to the brief tenure of our earthly life; (2) that we have a larger and more permanent existence; (3) that the spiritual world is a great reality and that there are many man-

sions in the Father's House; (4) that this life is "only the beginning of our pilgrimage"; (5) that there is "scope for talent and enterprise" on the other side; (6) that "our friends come to welcome us when we cross the barrier"; (7) that the veil between the two worlds is "wearing thin"; and (8) that it is possible to communicate with those whom we call dead, "given the right conditions". The beginning of Lodge's conviction on these subjects was derived from trance utterances of Mrs. Piper in 1889, when communications were received from deceased members of his own family, "which unmistakably shewed that they were just as living and active as ever". So far on the personal side, outside which "the last and most crucial evidence has been given since the death of F. W. H. Myers in 1901," an allusion to the results of "an ingenious and elaborate system of cross-correspondences," the records of which will be found in *Proceedings* of the S. P. R. Between the testimonies thus formulated and the grounds on which they stand, we obtain in this manner an adequate and lucid synopsis of a brilliant scientist's mature judgment on the alleged "age-old problem". But those who are in search of authentic certitude on their own part

* *Light*, March 23rd, pp. 177-179.

must realise that behind it lies the whole question of Mrs. Piper's mediumship and the memorials of Myers' *post-mortem* contributions to the enigmatic subject of spirit identity.

The long-outstanding debate on the "Margery" Mediumship has moved one stage further at least in the publication by the American S. P. R. of its continually deferred Report on the charges brought against Mrs. Crandon in respect of the "Walter finger-prints". It is comprised in a large octavo volume of 224 pages, extensive preliminaries, bibliographical appendix and page-plates not included.* Obviously therefore it is impossible to do more than indicate the conclusions reached by Mr. B. K. Thorogood, who has compiled the whole undertaking and is to be congratulated assuredly on the completion of an arduous work, whatever may be the verdict on his findings. It is not to be thought, however, that he stands alone therein: a remarkable preface—which is not that of Mr. Thorogood—speaks by implication with no uncertain voice in the name of the Society at large. The conclusions are: (1) that "there is no evidence of fraud, trickery or the use of any normal mechanism in connection with the séance production of the

Walter finger-print phenomena"; (2) that these are "definitely proved by the evidence to be supernatural"; and (3) that "neither of the Walter hands, as a whole nor as to any of the component parts, is identical with that of any known person or persons". These conclusions are underscored, outside the volume itself, by the Chairman of the A. S. P. R., Mr. W. H. Button, writing in the Society's *Journal*.† This is how the question stands at the present stage of its development: a word only can be added on certain ventures of criticism which have appeared so far in England. Mr. Stanley de Brath, who has devoted many years to psychical and spiritistic research, has produced at considerable length his individual reasons for accepting the Thorogood Report "as final and conclusive".‡ Mr. H. F. Prevost Battersby, who is also known among us, hopes that the "thumb-print controversy" will be buried once and for all in Mr. Thorogood's "competent and conscientious volume".§ We need not take too seriously the epistolary objections of the Rev. Herbert Thurston, S. J.,¶ and may rest content if Mr. E. J. Dingwall continues "to sit on the fence";§ but all persons concerned from all standpoints must be dissuaded from thinking that we have done with

* *Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research*, Vol. XXII, being third volume on the Margery Mediumship. The sub-title is: "The Walter Hands, a Study of their Dermatoglyphics," by Brackett K. Thorogood, New York, 1934. Dr. Crandon announced in London on Dec. 19th last that the work would extend to 500 pp. and 104 plates. The actual plates are 119 and pages as shewn above.

† See issue for January, 1934. pp. 9-13.

§ *Ib.*, February 2nd, pp. 65, 66.

§ *Ib.*, March 2nd, p. 135 and March 9th, p. 150.

† *Light*, March 2nd, 1934, pp. 137, 138.

¶ *Ib.*, February 16th and March 2nd.

the Walter prints, any more than with the Margery mediumship. The Boston S. P. R., which first gave space to the charges in its own official organ, may put in a last word or a new "Proceedings". We must wait and see.

The story of life on this planet, from the standpoint of scientific materialism and subsequently from another standpoint at issue therewith, is contemplated by Mr. Cyril E. M. Joad,* who is known in *Psychical Research*. He reminds us that, according to Sir James Jeans, "one tiny corner at least" in the mighty universe of atoms has (1) "chanced to become conscious for a time," but (2) "was designed in the end," and this under "the action of blind mechanical forces, to be frozen out," leaving the alleged corner in its precedent state, "a lifeless world". The hypothesis is in a pretty pickle as the wording stands, seeing that the chance came about in connection with a "designed" end concerning it, the undemonstrated designing THAT using available energies to achieve its plan. If this does not postulate conscious intelligence engaged in purposed work, the sooner Sir James Jeans re-edits his theme, the better for a world of readers which may be athirst to understand his drift. But if it does, we are offered the picture of conscious being at the back of the universe setting cosmic machinery at work to destroy the conscious; and this seems intolerable, even

for the foremost files of scientific material thought. On the horns of such a dilemma we must be content to leave the proposition and proceed to that which follows, as unfolded in the contrast before us. If material science is right, life is not only a product of material conditions but "a product of rotting matter preying like a fungoid growth upon the planet on whose surface it crawls". The explanation is that once upon a time our earth was "too hot and too moist to maintain life"; that an external crust formed as it began to cool; that the earth grew colder yet and the crust decayed; that "the evil humours of its corruption bred life, much as a rotting cheese will breed maggots". Hereof is the beginning, and as to the final end, life is "a chance passenger across a fundamentally alien and hostile environment"; and when conditions are no longer suitable that passenger "will finish his pointless journey with as little noise and significance as, in the person of the amoeba, he began it".

We know that story, almost from of old, and called it the Gospel of Slime; but it persists in certain circles and is less or more brought up-to-date. There is also Sir Arthur Keith, who has likened the "soul" or life to the "flame of a candle which goes out when the candle is burned". Mr. Joad says truly enough that the simile begs the question. If we must have "material images to illustrate the immaterial," he would think of the

* *The Contemporary Review*, February, 1934, pp. 177-183, s. v. "The Future and Prospects of Life".

body as a portable wireless set which receives wireless waves; and then at once it would be absurd to argue that if the set ceases to record, the waves have ceased to be. As to the counter-hypothesis which he places over against that of material science, it depicts life as an "immaterial force or stream, of which, in common with all other living creatures we are temporary individual expressions". It uses and directs the physical body, much as the fingers of a skilled pianist play upon his instrument. The picture again is familiar; but Mr. Joad adds that, on such assumption, the brain is like a telephone exchange and "transmits messages which it does not originate". Life in this case is "an activity other than matter" and directs it to its own purposes, much as the Jeans *ignotum quid* is said to apply the "blind mechanical forces". It can act on matter only at a given stage, there being only "certain kinds of chemical combinations which will take the current of life," even as some metals and not others will take that of electricity.

So far we are confronted by rival hypotheses, and predilection only can guide our choice between them. But there is something behind the contrast which places the alternatives in distinct positions. The affirmation that matter produces life is an appeal to a point of alleged fact within the world of physics, and if evidence fails here-on the dogmatic contention lapses. Now, science has sought long and earnestly, but in vain, to produce life

from anything except antecedent life. Bio-chemical research has reached a stage when it can manufacture "many of the organic compounds found in living organisms,"—urea, sugar and starch included. It infers herefrom that if this manufacture could be prolonged till protoplasm itself was obtained, then the "suitable treatment of such protoplasm" might and perhaps would exhibit the phenomena of organic life. Not alone, however, does this desired end remain unattained, but Mr. Joad indicates that its achievement could prove nothing, for that which would be manufactured by chemists would not be life, "but only the material that is capable of receiving it". He adds acutely that the identification of "synthetic protoplasm, which began to behave like a living creature, with the creation of life would be like saying that the builder who constructed a house had created the tenants who proceeded to occupy it." It follows that after all the speculations, all dogmatic findings, and with or notwithstanding all the galaxies of scientific discovery, it is still possible to hold with Mr. Joad, as he holds evidently, that "life is an independent activity which makes use of matter" and that the destruction of this planet would by no means involve that of life itself. It follows also that we can maintain unchallenged the poet's doctrine of the soul coming from afar and the deep things behind it, to which East and West gave witness of experience long ages before biological chemistry made its first experi-

ment. That witness still remains: it is not dead but living; and those who have willing ears in days to come may hear its voice, when our manifold schemes of research have reached their final term.

We ourselves meanwhile can listen to other voices which sound about us in immediate vicinities, and can note how each of them, after its own manner, says unto us *Consolamini, consolamini*, from many zones of thought. All recently, Mr. J. Scott Lidgett has proclaimed that the "Purposiveness of man is aligned with, emerges from, and confirms the suggestion of the Purposiveness of the Universe." Count Sforza reminds us how Francis of Assisi committed the salvation of Christendom to the inner man.[†] He is talking in reality about a supposed "Legend of Italian Scepticism"; but a spark falls from elsewhere and finds expression, since find it must; and it is taken into our hearts, as we take perhaps

that old Hermetic Axiom which pillories those who look without for a *secretum secretissimum et occlusum* that is only found within. Mr. J. C. Crowther recalls us to the "present unsurpassed activity in scientific research";[‡] but he leaves us contemplating "indescribably vast stretches of empty space"; and we wonder—indeed we wonder—whether a higher science will find that void a *plenum*. May it not be about or near the time desired by Mr. J. C. Stamp, when moralists and others will have learned, in the words of Canon Streeter,[§] that "science is the great cleanser: it renders possible no religion but the highest". Does not Dr. G. I. Wade, talking of Thomas Traherne as "Divine Philosopher," sketch the groundwork of this religion in his closing words on Traherne's "exquisite perception of the interrelations between all things in the Universe"?[¶] And the rock of this groundwork lies in the "Unity of life" realised.

A. E. WAITE

* *The Contemporary Review*, March, 1934, p. 314, s. v. "The Phenomenal and Reality".

† *Ibid.*, April, 1934, p. 438.

‡ *The Nineteenth Century*, February, 1934, pp. 208, 219, s. v., "New Particles".

§ *The Hibbert Journal*, April 1934, p. 399, s. v., "Must Science Ruin Economic Progress?"

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 408.

FRENCH NOTES

"For the last month, the scandal, born of a few individual weaknesses..." (*Le Matin*, February 7th, 1934). An indignant clamour greeted the first words of the speech which M. Deladier read to the French Chamber of Deputies. Individual weaknesses are but a slight aspect of what the Stavisky scandal has revealed. It has unmasked deep-rooted corruption in every branch of the government. France is not, however; the only country to suffer from moral degradation. We see similar dishonesty and corruption in every country; the whole world in its struggle for power, for money, for personal glory, has opened welcoming doors to racketeers, gangsters, thieves, swindlers and blackmailers. They pose as honest citizens, respectable men in fashionable dinner jackets. We have only to cite as examples the Tammany scandals in New York, and the recent bank investigations in Washington, D. C. In France such crimes once brought to the attention of the public could not be accepted peacefully, be it due to the more fiery Latin temperament or to a deeper sense of justice and of the rights of man. Confronted with political and financial failures here, all parties, all men, demanded a thorough cleaning of the governmental machinery. They not only demanded this, but fought for it. This manifestation would show that the public still has sufficient moral sense to want justice and honesty, although the immediate evil has not yet been eradicated in spite of the Doumergue Cabinet.

But what shall we say of those who allowed themselves to be used and exploited by Stavisky and his cohorts? M. Mounier writes (*Esprit*, March 1, 1934) on myths,—not the poetic legends, not the fabulous narratives of gods and goddesses, but the stupid, prosaic tales which politicians and financiers present to the average individual, who swallows them with evident relish. Lies, empty words, "the honour

of the party," "the integrity of the leader," fanning ardent faith into a blaze by a shallow appearance of nobility. "The masses, weary of being free, of facing their responsibilities, rush headlong into the ease of myth-believing." M. Mounier exhorts us to lead a revolution against these myths: struggle against the power of the financiers; pave the way for spiritual upliftment and regeneration; and in immediate crisis keep clear of political parties and their intrigues.

And we have other denouncers of evil. Books and especially the theatre have been means to that end; the old comedies of Athens, the great satires of Horace, Persius, and Juvenal; the comedies of Molière where evil was ridiculed and the tragedies of Corneille where honour and virtue were exalted. This use of literature for preaching has yielded many good results but we have had too many realists and naturalists who do not want to paint evil to encourage good, but rather who take pleasure in describing evil for its own sake. It is a sordid pleasure at best; still it seems to attract many. Francis de Miomandre calls this "le crime naturaliste" (*Les Nouvelles Littéraires*, January 20th, 1934) and Robert de Traz denounces the latest fashion in literature which tints most books with a certain vulgarity. (*Ibid.*, Dec. 30th, 1933)

And how easy it is to slip from denunciation of evil to preaching, promulgation of a new doctrine! Here again books and the theatre, and now more especially the cinema, play an important part. We should make a scandal of this too and fight for cleaner and saner productions. Many juvenile crimes can be laid directly at the door of some gripping detective story or some thrilling cinema. Bernard Champigneulle wrote an excellent article on the subject which we cannot resist quoting at length:

The danger is one of importance; so many make of the cinema their bread and meat, their indispensable drink, often their only spiritual food... An illusionary reflection of a distant universe, decked with the prestige of the unknown. To the humble inhabitants of the small towns, after these thrilling and sumptuous pictures, their lives appear too mediocre... The young country girl, the young provincial, is tempted to compare her life of work and peace with the marvellous activities of the heroines who flash before her enchanted eyes... They are all more or less consciously influenced... Those who leave home, the ancestral trade, to find adventure in a big city, to seek at least the semblance of independence, of brilliancy; all those whom we know, whom we meet every day, who have thrown aside their apron and their tools to clothe themselves in artificial silk, paint their finger nails and curve their eyebrows à la Greta Garbo! (*Mercure de France*, February 1st, 1934, pp. 554-576).

It may seem a paradox and yet it is true that the screen, for all its influence, is really but a faithful mirror reflecting the trend of our society, its desires, habits and inclinations. One acts upon the other; another vicious circle.

We can even now find some hopeful souls who refuse to believe that we are as bad as we seem. The fundamental principles of our society are still good; democracy is yet in the order of things: it is not facing a crisis. Some, like Rodolphe Laun, say that it is just as healthy as ever and that it is not preparing to meet its last phase. ("La démocratie—essai sociologique-juridique et de politique moral." Delgrane). As for capitalism M. Gaëton Pirou explains in his recent book ("*La crise du capitalisme*"), that nothing points to an immediate change. He feels that the social system in France to-morrow will be but a continuation of the present mixed and composite elements. For the most part we, the common masses, feel that change is coming and in a way we are eager for it.

Les Nouvelles Littéraires featured a very clever cartoon by Carlo Rim not long ago (February 24th, 1934): "The Carnival of 1934 or the Dilemma of M. Virgule." M. Virgule is confronted at the fancy dress store with the costumes of Peace, War, Fascism, Radicalism,

Revolution, Communism, Hitlerism. Which to choose? M. Virgule comes out of the shop with an elegant costume; a combination of the cap of Revolution, the black shirt of Fascism, the swastika of Hitlerism, the boots and trousers of Communism, the umbrella of Radicalism and the mask and bayonet of War crowned with the olive branch of Peace! Does not this not only represent the state of mind of the Occidental at present but also indicate that his real problem is his weak will and his befogged mind? Why cannot he determine his own mode of life and thus the mode of a new social order? The politician of to-day is like the priest of yesterday—an exploiter of the holy feelings of manhood. The man in the street will not energize himself to enquire, nor induce himself to decide, nor devise his own ways and means to a better life. Does he not get what he deserves?

Before we leave the political field we must call attention to a series of articles appearing in the *Mercure de France* on Germany and disarmament. France's "bête noire," even in the midst of internal turmoil, is still the armament activities of Germany. For France the internal struggle at the advent of the next war will be terrific. Many of course will rise to arms for the sake of the country: patriotism will be the national cry. But there are a great number of men, both among the last war generation and among the younger set, who sincerely desire peace and will refuse to fight. In 1914 some had enough strength to stand up for their great ideal. We heard of well-known men like Romain Rolland. Of the others more humble, we heard but little; they were quietly dealt with. This time there will be many more and the problem will be more difficult to cope with. A mere handful can be coerced or imprisoned, but if the number increases, what is to be done? This is a very serious question and one which is even now puzzling the militarists of France, although they are

counting a great deal on mass influence and group psychology.

One other problem should also be ranked among the most important of the present moment, but which unfortunately has not yet left its rather vague and shadowy background: the colonies. France has always been proud of her way of dealing with the colonies. She is convinced that she is playing the role of a kind, considerate stepmother—sometimes a little severe, overzealous to do the best for the foster-child. Her reputation thus taken for granted, other affairs have claimed her attention and she has left the immediate governing of her colonies in very incompetent hands. Several horrifying articles and books have come to light during the past months which reveal the true condition of the natives, the abuses of officers and officials—dishonesty, cruelty, torture. Andrée Viollis set forth facts on Indo-China; Marcel Homet reports on French Equatorial Africa. ("La Vérité sur l'Afrique Equatoriale Française," *Esprit*, March 1st, 1934). There is no intention of throwing discredit on any of the colonies, or upon the colonial regime as a whole. It is merely a question of putting before the public in an objective manner, the true situation, and awakening the interest of those who are sufficiently powerful and sufficiently humane to try to remedy it. We have, of course, had some excellent men at the head of our colonies, such as the Governor General Pierre Pasquier, who died tragically at the beginning of this year in the accident to the "Emeraude". But for one man like him, there are any number who fail miserably in their task. Driven by a desire for personal gain, perhaps by an inborn desire to inflict punish-

ments, these men become absolutely heartless in their treatment of the natives. Sanitary conditions, prisons, hospitals are in a lamentable state. Torture has reached a most refined and ingenious degree. However, in spite of many monthly journals on the economic, social and political conditions of the colonies, on their relations with the Motherland and with foreign countries, it is only through daring people—Andrée Viollis and others—that we are able to learn the truth. If it is given enough publicity, perhaps a new era for the colonies will dawn.

To turn to a more encouraging realm, that of philosophy, we find a masterly account of French contemporary philosophy in M. Benrubi's book: *Les sources et les courants de la philosophie contemporaine en France*. (2 vols. Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine, Paris, Alcan 1933). An excellent review of these two bulky volumes was published in *Revue Philosophique* (March-April 1934). M. Benrubi recognises three distinct currents: one, positive, scientific, a struggle against metaphysics and religion; the second, a critical idealism rising in opposition to the first, fighting against the dogmatism of science, laying down its boundaries and limitations; the third, "a metaphysical and spiritual positivism" inspired by a touch of mysticism. This last is the greatest and highest current, the most fitted "to enlarge the spiritual patrimony of humanity," and is therefore the most important. It is hopeful to note that it is also strong in numbers, having among its ranks many influential and well-known scholars. So in spite of our woes and cares there are still some who are struggling towards spirituality.

M. D. C.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE TRAINING OF YOUTH

[The two following contributions deal with the training of youth, and both curiously typify the prevailing biases in the present-day East and West. Dr. Bharatan Kumarappa outlines a course of religious training for the Hindu child, which, despite its ideal of tolerance, is tinctured with sectarianism. He expresses himself unequivocally in favour of the Sunday School system obtaining in the U. S. A., but we question very much whether the present religious state of that country is any recommendation for the adoption of such a system for India. Mr. Leslie A. Paul, whose novel *Periwake* has recently been published by Denis Archer, is founder and leader of the Woodcraft Folk. Here he presents his educational aims. Both programmes are partial, but the latter has the sounder basis. The Grith Fyrd camps for unemployed youths are the logical outgrowth of its ideals; their aim is the reorientation of man to his natural and human environment through "the inner or spiritual experience of the shared life" under conditions as close to nature as can be achieved. Mr. Paul does not believe in teaching religion, whether it be "the local and particularised expressions of the religious spirit" or "the devotion of man to something greater and finer than himself". Of the latter he says: "We do not teach that either, we live it". Living the life, in free contact with nature, as do Mr. Paul's people, is no doubt excellent, but surely there is something of the spiritual life *that can be taught*, else the Sages have lived in vain. Dr. Kumarappa tends too much towards sectarianism, but Mr. Paul, in his escape from such a pitfall, is apt to err in the opposite direction. There are simple truths which can be taught to the young, by which they can guide their lives. These truths lie beyond creeds and also beyond the lessons that physical nature can teach us.—EDS.]

I.—THE RELIGIOUS TRAINING OF THE HINDU CHILD

In every realm of human thought and action—science, art, morality, industry, social and economic organisation, politics, education—there is dissatisfaction with the old and a wistful search for the new. More especially is this true in a country like India, which after centuries of civilisation of its own has recently been brought into contact with a civilisation differing very widely from it and extremely vocal and aggressive. Whatever the contact has meant for the foreigner, it has certainly shaken us, and thoughtful Indians here and there are applying themselves to the work of reconstruction. At the moment the work of this kind absorbing the greatest attention is being carried on in the realm of politics; but more silently it is also being carried on in other realms such as

art, literature, industry, agriculture, and more especially in the form of legal and social reform. There is no doubt that religion which supplies one of the main springs of culture has also not remained unaffected. The numerous religious societies which have sprung up during the last century within Hinduism, with which alone we are concerned here, are witnesses to this fact. But there is one form of religious reconstruction (and that the most important, for it is the most effective, and one that has unfortunately not yet been attempted within the fold of Hinduism), to which I wish to direct special attention. It is the religious training of the Hindu child.

In times past the child—at least, the boy of highest caste—was sent to lead the life of a Brahmachari under the

supervision and guidance of a teacher. Here he learnt among other things the Vedas, Upanishads, and the vital truths of religion, and that not in a merely academic way but in such a way that the boy practised in everyday life the religion that he was taught. The guru was not a mere schoolmaster as now understood. He was often a philosopher and a saint, of noble life and character, and the boy would learn from him not the religious superstitions, practised at the time by the masses, but a religion tested by thought and conduct in the life of the guru himself. In this way the religion taught was one that had grown out of the personal life and experience of the teacher, and the religion imparted was, we may conjecture, from the ethical and philosophical points of view, about the best that the age could produce. The method employed at this time appears also to have been very sound. The pupil was not given learned lectures on religion for him to digest as best he might, but judging from the few records (for example, in the Upanishads) that have come down to us, he was led by stages to discover the truths of religion for himself, the teacher merely aiding and directing. The teaching was generally in the form of a dialogue and came in answer to a felt need. Thus we are told, for example, that Upakosala dwelt as a Brahmachari in the house of Satyakama Jabala for twelve years without tuition regarding Brahman, at the end of which period he became so eager to learn regarding Brahman that he was not even able to eat his food, so much so that the fires which he tended took pity on him and taught him. That is to say, the pupil arrived at his conclusions independently of the teacher. It was only after the pupil himself had thus struggled for knowledge that Satyakama Jabala proceeded to instruct him regarding Brahman (*Chhandogya Upanishad* IV, 10-15). We thus see that both in content and in method the religious instruction given to boys within the Brahmanic community at this early

age was of a high order.

What happened in the past, however, is of little practical interest if it does not teach us lessons for the present. Since our ancestors had evolved such an effective system of religious instruction in their day, we should turn to the present and ask ourselves what organisations we have produced in our day. The answer, one grieves to state, is that we have produced absolutely none. The boys and girls in an average Hindu home grow up with no systematic religious instruction. They may, without understanding, partake in the ritualistic worship conducted daily in the home or in the temple. They may recite Sanskrit slokas without knowing their meaning, and they may listen to the stories of gods and heroes as depicted in the Epics and in the Puranas. But with such meagre training what can they know of their religion at its best? Can we be surprised then if young men to-day with a little education have little or no use for their religion and regard religion as superstition? Unless religion is re-interpreted from age to age, and taught in a manner to be intelligible to men living in an ever-moving, changing world, it can have little influence on their lives and like all things which have failed to fulfil their function, must die a natural death.

It is therefore especially necessary that Hinduism should be re-interpreted and expounded in the light of modern knowledge. It is no use, on the one hand, falling back upon the old traditional religion, for traditionism is the worst enemy of genuine religion. Nor is it much use, on the other hand, merely re-interpreting Hinduism in a learned academic way. Our object should be to disseminate our knowledge in simple form among children and among peasants—even more among children than among peasants, for the mind of the child is open and capable of being moulded in a way in which the adult mind is not.

In this connection we may learn from the West, notably from the Uni-

ted States, where religious instruction is given chiefly in Sunday Schools attached to churches; in them the work of educating the youth of the community, ranging in age from four to twenty-five or beyond, in religion is very systematically undertaken. Text books are published on the books of the Bible, Christian doctrine, the sacraments of the Church, etc.; systematic graded curricula are gone through to suit the age of the pupil. Sunday School work has advanced to such an extent that it has been found impossible to carry it on at all effectively without the employment of teachers specially trained for it. Special Sunday School teacher-training institutions have thus grown up, and College men and women qualify themselves for the work just as they qualify themselves for any other profession. It is not necessary to go into the details, but basing ourselves upon the results achieved there we might make some definite suggestions regarding how we may attempt to educate our children in Hinduism.

The child's life centres round the home, the school and the temple, and these are the institutions through which religious instruction may be attempted.

1. *The Home*: The place in which the life and activity of the child first find their expression is the home, and it is here that all religious education must take its start. The child who has had no religious education given to him in his home suffers always under a serious handicap. It is in early childhood that the mind is most impressionable and what the child learns at this age forms a part of him and is woven into the very fibre of his being. Hence it is all important to teach the child nothing at this stage that he will have to unlearn.

The child should be taught to begin with a little prayer. The mother or the father should pray with the child in simple language that it can understand. Two or three sentences voicing the little one's gratitude to the Divine

Being for protection, and expressing its desire for the welfare of all beings will suffice. Similarly when the child retires to bed at night another such simple prayer should be made. The child should be encouraged with the help of its parents to compose its own prayers as soon as it is able. If the father is accustomed to perform the domestic rites before the family shrine, he must have his children with him and must explain to them the significance of what he is doing. He should read a passage out of a devotional book, explaining it if necessary, and spend a brief period of prayer and meditation with them. When the child is old enough to read it should be presented with a book of devotion suited to its age, and this book it should be taught to read on rising in the morning and on going to bed, this period of devotion ending always with a prayer whereby the child learns of its own accord to commune with its Maker. This is a rough sketch of what might be undertaken in the home in the way of religious education. Individuals may add to, or subtract, from it. But it must always be remembered not to make religion a burden to the child by making religious discourses or prayers too long. Besides, the child should be encouraged to cultivate its own individual form of worship.

2. *The School*: Experience in the West seems to show that it is best not to attempt religious education to any very great extent in secular schools. But that is only because in the West the Sunday School attached to the church is so well organized that religious education may be left safely in its hands. Secular schools are attended by children belonging to various denominations, and it is not possible to give the pupils instruction suitable to their own particular denominations. Sunday Schools, on the other hand, are run by denominational churches and so can give the children such instruction. This has been found to be the most satisfactory arrangement, and hence is followed widely in the West. But not

all secular schools leave the work of religious education of their pupils to the Sunday school. There are, especially in Britain, what are known as Church schools. These are somewhat similar to the missionary schools in India in that they give secular education but they devote a part of their curriculum to definite religious instruction along the lines of their particular denomination.

We in India should probably find it best to follow the example of the United States in restricting the ordinary school to secular education, for children in India not only belong to different sects within Hinduism, but also to quite different religions. The religious institutions to which the children belong must, therefore, as in the United States, undertake the responsibility of instructing their young in the fundamentals of their faith. Nevertheless, the ordinary schools may begin their day's work with a short period of worship, when a passage may be read from one of the Scriptures or from the sayings of the saints of any religion, and a short hymn be sung or prayer recited. It is necessary that such hymn or prayer be one in which children of diverse creeds or sects may all equally join.

3. *The Temple*: If the ordinary schools are to give little or no religious instruction, the main work of religious education must as in the West be undertaken by religious bodies. The temple must run a school within its precincts for this purpose. But if the temple authorities, owing to conservatism or to disagreement with the broad type of religious education that is to be given, are unwilling to house the school within the temple precincts, a place outside could easily be secured for the purpose. The school might meet once a week, for about an hour. The worship would begin with all the children assembling together for scripture reading, hymn and prayer, after which they would disperse to their several classrooms. The classes should be according to age. For example,

for children of four to six years old, the kindergarten class; six to nine, elementary; nine to fourteen junior; fourteen to eighteen intermediate; and eighteen upwards, senior. The work of the kindergarten would be chiefly religious story-telling with the aid of pictures, and if possible models, songs and memorizing of little verses or prayers suited to children of that age. The work of the other departments would have to be graded, and take the child through a regular course in selections from the Hindu scriptures, and readings in the history of Hinduism and Hindu religious literature:—if a denominational colouring is desired the history of the particular sect to which the children belong, beliefs and practices of sects within Hinduism, comparative religion giving a sympathetic account of religions such as Buddhism, Jainism, Islam and Christianity (there should be opportunities here of inculcating religious toleration and bridging the wide gulf that now exists, for example, between Islam and Hinduism), lives of the great religious leaders of Hinduism, the significance of the more important Hindu rites, and an account of Hindu religious festivals and their significance. The senior department may consist chiefly of study and discussion groups.

In all this work of instructing the young, the main objective of religious education should never be forgotten, and that is not to inform the understanding merely, but to cultivate in the rising generation the spirit of true religion, which is to love God and to love our fellowmen. It must be made clear that this is all that matters, the external form of religion, whether it be details of creed or ritual, being of little account.

It is obvious that work such as this cannot be undertaken without textbooks. At the moment there is hardly anything in the way of suitable textbooks. I use the word "text-books" in a broad sense to include hymn books, prayer books and books of devotion written for the benefit of the

young. Books of various kinds would have to be written,—books for family worship containing scriptural readings, meditations and prayers; little hymns, prayers and religious stories written specially for very young children; hints to parents as to how to teach their children regarding God, books of religious passages and prayers suitable for use in secular schools; and books on all the topics mentioned above in connection with the religious education of the temple. Each topic must be dealt with in a graded fashion, leading the child on as it grows from year to year into fuller and fuller knowledge.

Besides all these, text books will have to be written for the use of tea-

chers. Training centres will have to be established where teachers can obtain instruction in the subjects outlined above, besides instruction in the principles and practice of teaching, child psychology, story telling and such like.

It is obvious that there is a whole field here waiting to be opened up, carefully mapped out and cultivated. The work is one that is of vital importance, and yet one that has not yet been so much as thought about. If a group of earnest minded men of ability met together over the matter, much might be done in obtaining the necessary literature and organizing the necessary institutions.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

II.—THE EDUCATIONAL BASIS OF THE WOODCRAFT FOLK

Readers of THE ARYAN PATH who have read that Neptunian sermon to humankind, the novel *Last Men in London*, by W. Olaf Stapledon, will remember how creatively the author reconstructed the struggle between man's better and worse natures, between his human and simian characteristics, between his dawning sense of loyalty to the human spirit and his self-engrossment, and between that loyalty and his feeling of impotence beneath the overwhelming grandeur of fate. Despite the school teacher mannerisms of the author, they may have been as moved by it as I was, and have felt that it was a remarkable effort to put down clearly what many of us have been thinking for a long time.

There is a struggle between the animal and human aspects of man's character—how far inevitable none of us know—and between his personal struggle for life and his loyalty to the human spirit. This is not new, I know. What is new, perhaps, is the depth of human perception of it.

Man is tugged this way by personal, and that by public, interests; here by bodily urgencies, there by intellectual interests. All the real attempts at

education (and by "real" I mean those which start from contact with life and not from an academic and pedantic tradition) have, whether they are aware of it or not, a deep impulse to reconcile the conflicting interests of man and out of such a reconciliation to germinate a new, harmonious flowering of humanity. Educationists, aghast at the mauling which the young and lovely human spirit receives in childhood, and intuitively aware of thwarted human potentialities, exclaim "*There! There is man's crime. Give us the children and we can remake man.*"

Human dislocations, the terrible attrition of human delicacy and fineness through sexual maladjustments, the oppressing of human life through economic, imperial and political perversity and exploitation, these, we say, have their spring in the pitifully timid education of the masses. Give us a different system of education, we say, and we will give you a new mankind. It is not so simple as that, of course. Before we can recast education we must recast human society. But a start can be made in a small way to break the vicious circle.

It was in this spirit that the Wood-

craft Folk commenced their educational work some eight years ago and have since expanded it continually despite hardships and world crises which cripple our resources.

The impulse which drove us to work was precisely this. Mankind hovers on the verge of a new world. His economic power has so far advanced, his mechanical grip on resources and production is so extensive and complete that now—at this moment!—granted the will, a form of society could be established in which man, freed from poverty, could go from adventure to adventure of the human spirit. We felt that man's history was only just beginning, that before he had been sub-human. That was the vision. The bitter reality was that children were not given freedom to grow; that new worlds might grow and old worlds die, uncomprehended by their stunted intelligences; that before they reached the age at which they could be of use to society they were already spiritually warped, their ideas on human sexual relationships tainted, their curiosities in all but this destroyed, their imaginations deadened and their bodies, more often than not, prematurely sapped of joy and will.

Out of the conflict between the vision and the reality was borne upon us the need to undertake educational work among children. We did not discriminate between classes, but we concentrated on workers' children. They would inherit the earth.

Our first task was to give the children a breath of something less mechanical and artificial than they found in towns. So we became an open air movement. We wanted children to grow physically so that their minds would flower in sound bodies. In the open they were initiated into a freer yet simple life—sun, air, water, growing things, campfires. Life was at once more primitive and more exacting. Food had to be prepared before it could be cooked, cooked before it could be eaten. Fires had to be lit before it could be prepared. Wood had

to be collected before fires could be lit. Cause and effect.

Co-operation between all members of the group was necessary at camp or nobody could enjoy anything. In fact, what we created for them in the open was a more primitive type of human society, one whose demands and achievements immature minds could readily appreciate.

This co-operative principle was underlined by the co-educational nature of our work and the complete absence of any military tradition and procedure. A few simple ceremonies (cf. "The Folk Trail") and the group tradition took the place of the old "do-as-you-are-told-and-ask questions—afterwards-if-you-dare" attitude to children.

Group-activity and group-responsibility have a far-reaching democratic significance. The real democracy must be a democracy of work. The real check upon leaders by the led can only take place through small groups whose members know each other well. The small group gives the widest basis of individual participation in common activities. And upon the effective participation of the masses in the work of the world the future society must base itself.

Important as these things are, our work does not end there. We want children to flower individually. We gave them the opportunity to be freer of their bodies—to swim, to run about as near to nakedness as the law permits, to sun bathe, so that the evils of bodily repression would be eliminated in the generation we were teaching. After battles with outsiders who affirmed that children in bathing slips were immoral, we established a freedom in this which has since been adopted by other bodies.

To over-emphasise freedom from taboos can be as dangerous as the taboos themselves. So we worked this side fanaticism.

We were anxious that children should train their brains through their hands as well as their heads. So we taught them woodcraft—cooking, light-

ing fires, pitching tents, tracking, nature lore and simple camp handicrafts. This learning-by-doing principle we carried further by training in handicrafts at indoor meetings. Children of the Woodcraft Folk make their own belts and costumes, totem poles and banners etc., decorate their belongings and bring as much colour into the movement by their own work as they can. Colour we regard as a release from the drabness and ugliness of modern life. Self-expression is also encouraged through songs, dancing, dramatic work and pageantry.

To summarise—we brought children into the open and gave them room to grow. We taught them to use their hands and their hearts and to grow unafraid of life.

Our work did not cease there. The flowering, the observable flowering of young life under these conditions was a fine thing, but not fine enough. At camp they were in a world of their own. What of the world which would reach out for them when they were fourteen and clamp them to a desk or a bench for many hours a day, most days of the year? It had little use for flowering personalities, unless they happened to be rich. Flowering personalities were a nuisance, they rebelled, they dodged discipline, they had a contempt for the glittering prizes. They were suppressed.

It was all very well for children to grow fit and lovely in the open. But if we were to leave them in ignorance of what the world might do to them we should be committing the same crime as older generations.

What would the world do to them? Unemployment. War. Exploitation. Poverty. The tale is long and sorry. What had we got to say about it?

Two things. First, that human society had crawled out of pitiful depths to its present power. It had achieved magnificent things as well as despicable things in the process of crawling, but there was something fine in the spectacle. We wanted children to get the human struggle in perspective. And

so we gave them elementary instruction in biology and world history.

The second thing—unemployment, war, exploitation, belong to a past stage in human society. A new world can be built in which these things have no part. The dying old world lingers on, torn to pieces by its internal dissensions. A new society must be built if the waste of human life is not to go on. We taught that children would be the builders or the inheritors of that new world and that they had to look upon their lives as lives which are pledged to the service of their fellowmen in the cause of the human spirit. Co-operation? Socialism? Bolshevism? Call it what you will. It has to be taught to the young or we are betraying them.

And so I am back where I began. Human society is only just beginning. The Folk, too, feel that they will be in the forefront of human venture. For they live for the flowering-out of the human spirit.

I shall be asked whether we teach religion, or what I mean by the human spirit. If by religion is meant sectarian creed, or obeisance to a particular ritual or set of dogmas, or even the belief in the immortality of the human soul—well, no, we do not teach it. I, for one, have no use for the local and particularised expressions of the religious spirit. But for the religious spirit itself, by which I mean the devotion of man to something greater and finer than himself, then we do not teach that either, we live it.

I do not propose to define the human spirit. Those who would like to do so are at liberty to identify it with the soul. To me it is something more subtle and less divorced from body. Something which goes on through humanity though bodies are born and die.

Finally—is there anything new or peculiar about our organization? No, nothing particularly new, unless it be, in this dispirited age, a health of mind and body and faith and enthusiasm for the new world we shall help to build.

London.

LESLIE A. PAUL

INDIAN MISREPRESENTATION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

I

We sincerely congratulate Dr. Naga Raja Sarma for bringing up for public discussion the tenets of Dvaita-Vedanta by contributing to THE ARYAN PATH a series of four learned articles from January to April, 1934.

Dr. Sarma is known to Indian readers as a scathing critic. His criticism an eminent editor of an Indian philosophical journal described to me as "judicial criticism" in contrast to "inductive criticism". Like a magistrate he passes judgment on others' views. Dr. Dasgupta has presented Indian philosophy according to current Indian tradition and method, whereas Dr. Radhakrishnan has done so in the light of modern thought. Though Dr. Sarma admits that "both the authors have done splendid service in the cause of Indian philosophy, their scholarship is widely recognised and admired. They have an international status as philosophers,"—his articles contain small trace of appreciation but only unfavourable criticism.

Dr. Sarma's suggestion that Indian thought must not be interpreted in the light of Western concepts proves his outlook clouded by orthodoxy. This is an age of international understanding. Insularity and indifference on the part of a thought-system mean death to it. Ancient methodology must give place to the modern scientific one; otherwise philosophy is doomed. That is why some modern thinkers say that India has no philosophy except an antiquated theological system. For this Dr. Sarma and others who want to represent Indian philosophy as it is are seriously to blame. Drs. Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta are mainly responsible for the present day world-wide appreciation of and interest in Indian philosophy. Their attempts may not be free from defects but that does not mean that they have misrepresented Indian philosophy. Moreover, human thought is going beyond its natural limits in evolving a world

philosophy, and in that Indian philosophy has a very great contribution to make. Dr. Sarma himself admits that ancient Indian philosophy has a message universal in appeal.

Dr. Sarma's main contention is that the two doctors have not devoted much attention in their works to Dvaita-Vedanta. He asserts that Dvaitism is as hallowed a tradition in Indian philosophy as Advaitism. Prof. M. Hiriyanna of Mysore University, one of the profoundest living authorities on Vedanta, has omitted the Dvaitavada from his *Outline of Philosophy* as having made no marked contribution to the philosophical world. The West is tired of hearing about Dualism. They have enough of Dualistic philosophy and religion. Anything of the same nature from India simply repels them. It was the Hindu metaphysics of Advaita-Vedanta which influenced Hegel, Schopenhauer, Max Müller, Deussen, Royce, James, etc.

Theology is a matter of faith, and it differs with peoples, nay, from man to man. Dr. Carpenter in his *Comparative Religion* said that theologies are many but Religion is one. And in India religion and philosophy are not separate as in the West. Still, it is surprising that Dr. Sarma, setting out to expound philosophy, should place so much emphasis on faith. Philosophy is not so much concerned with faith as with reason. Dr. Chakravarty of Madras Presidency College in reply to Dr. Sarma recently called faith the most wicked thing. He is right in a sense. Another writer claims that the unseen accompaniment of faith is bloodshed, wars, the Inquisition etc. That is why philosophy stresses exercise of reason.

Dr. Sarma opines that if the West can understand and admire the Monism of Kant and Spinoza it should find no difficulty in understanding and admiring the Monistic edifice of Sankara. The West, with its scientific intellect,

can no doubt comprehend Vedanta, but Vedanta in which form? Is it in the form of translation of Sanskrit texts, as Dr. Sarma wants to present it, unalloyed by Western thought, or in its modern interpretation? Certainly not the former; otherwise long before the publication of the books of Drs. Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta the West would have understood them. Many of the Vedantic Sanskrit texts were translated long ago, but Westerners never cared to look at them. Indian philosophy in its Indian form is naturally unintelligible to the West and so till recently it drew little or no attention from Western thinkers. Hence the urgent necessity of modern interpretation.

Dr. Sarma concludes that as the *Gita* does not state explicitly the theory of Adhyasa the import of the *Gita* is not Advaita. The primary concern of Advaitavada is to establish Brahman or the ultimate Reality or Truth, devoid of Desha, Kala and Nimitta or, in Kantian terminology, Space, Time and Causation. Mayavada is an explanation of the theory of Advaita and hence it is secondary. Mayavada wants to prove the theory of nescience which obstructs the Brahman consciousness of man. Dr. P. D. Shastri, formerly of Calcutta Presidency College, a most orthodox Vedanta scholar of wide repute, shows in his *Doctrine of Maya* that not only in the *Gita*, but in the Upanishads and the Vedas as well, the theory of Maya exists in more or less developed form.

Dr. Sarma points out that there are passages in the Upanishads with Dvaita signification. Nobody denies that. But does that mean that the philosophy of the Upanishads is Dvaitavada? Then how can the passages with Advaita import be explained away? Here he has given the age-old stock arguments to support Dvaitavada. But we challenge Dr. Sarma to find in the ten principal Upanishads with Sankara's commentary one single passage where Dvaita is extolled. Emphatically nowhere. Everywhere *Ekam eva Advitiam*—One without a second—has been glorified,

It is a pity that Dr. Sarma confounds Monism with Non-dualism. His rendering of Visistadvaita as Qualified Monism or rather Pluralism, and not as Qualified Non-Dualism is palpably wrong. Visistadvaita is not Visista + Dvaita, but Visista + Advaita. Dvaita means Dualism and necessarily Advaita means etymologically Non-dualism. How can it then be Pluralism? Monism is the theory of the one. The knowledge of the One implies the knowledge of the many, for, as every student of logic and epistemology knows, that knowledge is possible only by comparison and contrast. Hence Advaita is Non-dualism and not Monism. The Upanishadic phrase Advitiya—not two—is most correct, as what Brahman is essentially, is beyond the reach of all concepts. With Madhva he holds that the external world is as stubbornly real as the supreme Brahman. If matter has a degree of reality equal to that of spirit, then what is the definition of reality in his opinion? What is the criterion of Truth? If God changes as does matter, then that God is no better than a phantom. Change signifies imperfection. But an imperfect God is no God. We see matter changing constantly before our eyes. The whole of modern science, particularly the new physics, has not yet been able to find out the ultimate nature of matter. All modern scientists are of one opinion—that matter is indefinable—just as the Advaitists say that it is *anirvachaniyam*. How, then, can matter be ultimately real? But at the same time nobody denies the pragmatic or concessional reality or the *Vyavaharika Satta* of matter.

Dr. Radhakrishnan tries to reconcile the Dvaita, Visistadvaita and Advaita passages of the Upanishads. As the Upanishads contain three kinds of passages there can be three kinds of interpretations of the Upanishadic philosophy, as expounded by the commentaries of Sankara, Ramanuja and Madhva. So why does Dr. Sarma try to depreciate one at the expense of the other? Dr. Radha-

krishnan has doubtless displayed remarkable originality and philosophical acumen in his attempt to harmonise the three schools; they are not at all contradictory but supplementary to each other. They are true from different standpoints. In the *Rig Veda* itself it is said, "*Ekam Sat vipra bahudha vadanti*"—"Truth is one though the sages call it variously". Max Müller agreed with Vignana-Bhikshu, Madhusudhan Saraswati and others in the view that behind the different schools of Indian philosophy there is a common philosophy of which these systems are but aspects.

From different mental angles the philosophers have propounded the theories of Dualism, Qualified Non-dualism and Non-dualism, as Hanuman said to Sri Ramachandra, "As body I am your servant, as Mind I am your part, and as spirit I am thou". Thus from the planes of body, mind and spirit, Brahman is realised as the personal, the impersonal, and the Absolute. Accordingly, in our Indian philosophy there are three kinds of cosmology—Arambhavada, Parinamavada and Vivartavada. As long as body idea persists God is seen with form as an extra-cosmic being and the world appears as real. That is the position of Madhva and the Dualists. But that is not the ultimate goal. If the aspirant pushes further he sees God as immanent in the Universe. He perceives that the Creator and the creation are unified. Man sees himself as part and parcel of God. That is the

standpoint taken by Ramanuja and his followers. Then comes the experience of *Tat Twam Asi*—"That thou art." Man realises that he is God spiritually and the world appears as a mirage. So physically man is Dvaitist, mentally he is Visistadvaitist and spiritually he is Advaitist. This is in essence the message of the Upanishads.

In conclusion, we wish to show that Dr. Sarma's exposition of the *Gita* does not contain the traditional orientation. Repudiating Dr. Radhakrishnan, he says that the *Gita* is a systematic philosophical construction or a code of morality. What are the definitions of philosophy given by all modern philosophers? If the *Gita* is a system of philosophy, then what may the philosophies of Kant, Hegel and Spinoza be called? Nor is the *Gita* only a code of morality. On that theory can Dr. Sarma account for the different kinds of Yoga, such as Dhyana Yoga, Karma Yoga, Gnana Yoga etc.? At the end of every chapter Sri Krishna says that the *Gita* is Yoga Sastra.

In general, it may be said that Dr. Sarma's criticism emphasises insignificant points: in these studies he has played the role more of a philologist than of a philosopher. Modern Indian scholars show ingenious skill in hair-splitting arguments and textual interpretations. The Indian Pandits can reproduce voluminous books, but they cannot understand underlying ideas in relation to the whole.

Mysore. SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

II

While I had readily anticipated that the series of articles contributed by me to THE ARYAN PATH under the above-mentioned general title would be greeted with sharp criticism and opposition by the admirers of the authors of *Indian Philosophy* and *A History of Indian Philosophy*, I had not expected that Mr. K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar, would confine his remarks to one or

two disparaging references to Dualists and Pluralists or that Swami Jagadiswarananda would embark on a vindication of Monism or Absolutism, arranging Dvaita, Vishishtadvaita, and Advaita, in an ascending order of superiority based on spiritual experiences. The Swamiji has attacked Dvaita, and attempted a vindication of Advaita. By way of reply to Mr. Iyengar and

Swamiji, I would like to emphasize the following facts every one of which could be argued out, if space permitted.

(1) There is room for difference of opinion as to the best and the most effective manner in which the absence of traditional Indian orientation from the works of the two distinguished Indian philosophers may be demonstrated. In the course of contributions appearing in journals, only specimen sentences can be cited, and those cited by me, whether they are divorced from or dovetailed into their contexts, stand typical of the un-Indian exposition of Indian philosophy. Mr. Iyengar queries—"Were Sankara, Ramanuja, and Madhva then devoid of Indian orientation because they have all taken sides and equated the *Gita* and Upanishad teaching either with Monism or with Pluralism . . . etc.?" No one would venture to accuse the Acharyas at all, as they have all very rightly and legitimately taken sides, but since modern Indian philosophers have condemned Sankara for his Absolutism and applauded him for his courage in the same breath, and as they proclaim they are fascinated by the Monistic edifice, but feel nervous lest it may collapse before they enter and so forth, they have to be viewed guilty of lack of loyalty to Indian tradition. The two authors have attacked Sankara and his Absolutism. Yet, they somehow feel that the equation between Atman and Brahman is the ultimate truth. This, I maintain, is an attitude that does violence to Indian tradition.

I am not so philosophically uncivilised as to attempt any denial of freedom to the two philosophers of their own interpretation. I shall take a crucial instance. Neither the author of *Indian Philosophy* nor the author of *A History* could agree with Sankara regarding the supreme problem of "Adhyasa," to an interpretation of which they have administered their own orientations. Attacking this or that Acharya piecemeal is a childish game. "I reject Sankara's interpretation of the *Gita*—I cannot accept his

version of Maya and Adhyasa. His account is the same as that of Mahayana Buddhism—and yet Madhva is a religionist. His is not a philosophy at all." Modern interpreters of Indian thought to the West who proclaim the jargon noted in the previous sentence cannot but be condemned or classified as *untraditional*. The authors of both *Indian Philosophy* and *A History*, are convinced that Sankara's Advaita does not differ in essentials from Mahayana Buddhism. This is resented and repudiated by the custodians of Indian tradition. If the modern interpreters repudiate tradition, they find themselves in the company of Madhvacharya whose Dualism and Pluralism are to them anathema. What is the Indian thought they interpret to the West? Is it Sankara's? No. They disagree with his main thesis of Illusionism. Is it Madhva's? No. They reject his Dualism and Pluralism. I do not know anything about Dr. Dasgupta's attitude to Madhva because his volume on the works of that Acharya is yet to appear. But Dr. Radhakrishnan has plainly stated that Madhva's work does not belong to Indian Philosophy proper. Such philosophical misstatements should be repudiated and exposed then and there. If Mr. Iyengar desires to make sure what I mean by "traditional Indian orientation," let him read or re-read the discussion of the relation between Buddhism and Advaita in the works of the two philosophers.

(2) Swami Jagadiswarananda may be told that for the benefits of a very doubtful international understanding—benefits largely economic and political in character—philosophical truths grounded on age-long traditions should not be repudiated or thrown overboard. It is absolutely immaterial to me whether this or that writer devotes any portion of his work to Madhvacharya or not. But my complaint has been that the interpretation of the philosophy of Sankara attempted by the two philosophic moulders of international opinion and understanding has been *untraditional*,

though I have not failed to emphasize that sufficient justice has not been done to the work of Madhvacharya. When even an avowed opponent of Dvaita like Appaya Dikshita has admitted the undoubted excellence of the Dvaita Vedanta it is astonishing that Swamiji should seek to reject Dvaita root and branch, for the reason that Mr. Hiri-yanna has omitted Dvaita from his book. I must say the philosophical prestige and integrity of the Dvaita do not depend on the futile and flimsy reason of its having been omitted by this or that author from his book.

The West may be tired of Dualism and Pluralism. Yet the philosophical worth of Dualism and Pluralism may not suffer at all. When the Advaita Vedanta has not moulded the practical life of philosophers in India itself, it is idle to contend that writers like Deussen and thinkers like Schopenhauer were influenced by Advaita to any considerable degree. That interest in Indian philosophy was kindled only after the publication of *Indian Philosophy* and *A History* is an *ipse dixit* which I am not bound to accept.

I gladly accept the Swamiji's challenge. "Dvasuparna-Sayuja" and passages of similar import support the Dvaita. Nay, I claim more, as this claim has been elaborately substantiated. Even the passage "Tatvamasī" supports Dvaita, because, Madhva has argued that the Upanishadic text should be split up into "A-tat-tvamasī"—Thou art not-That.

Swamiji attributes to me a rendering of Vishistadvaita which is not mine. Let there be no quibbling. Monism is and must be the same as Non-Dualism. My complaint was that Drs. Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta had uncritically adopted the wrong rendering of Vishisht-

advaita into "Qualified Non-Dualism or Qualified Monism". Vishishtadvaita is *not* Monism at all, but, emphatically *Pluralism*. Three fundamental entities endowed with the same degree of reality, namely, Chit, Achit, and Isvara are admitted by Vishishtadvaita. I have made this clear along with the traditional import of the term in the course of the footnote published towards the end of the opening article of my series.

If the author of *Indian Philosophy* has tried as observed by the Swamiji to reconcile Dvaita, Advaita, and Vishishtadvaita passages in the Upanishads, he has attempted the impossible. One may as well attempt a reconciliation of the Spinozistic Monism and Leibnitzian Pluralism. There is no sacrosanctity about the order adopted by the Swamiji. For instance, one may say—Physically all are Advaitins—for, dust are all and to dust all return. Mentally one may be a Vishishtadvaitin, and spiritually a Dvaiti as he realizes the Overlordship of God. Let Dvaita stand or fall on its own merits. The destinies of Dvaita whatever they be do not surely depend on Mr. Hiri-yanna and his work.

I have summed up in my own words Sankara's interpretation of the message of the *Gita*, and Madhva's interpretation of it as well. Between a system of philosophy and a code of morality there is absolutely no antagonism or incompatibility whatever, and the Swamiji has raised no relevant objection at all to my description of the *Gita* as containing a system of philosophy and as proclaiming a code of morality. The different yogas, the concomitant spiritual practices and the goal to be reached come under the latter, while the metaphysical system falls under the former.

Kumbakonam R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“—————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS.

The Hitler dictatorship of the mind is Heinrich Mann's theme in *Foreign Affairs* for April. The intellectuals who have remained in Germany have had to submit to the system of controlled thought imposed by the Nationalist Socialist Party, of whom the exile writes:—

Thought becomes materialized in their hands and is simply a mechanism conveniently placed at the disposal of the strongest. Only official truths are admitted, and only such creative work as happens to serve the purpose of the authorities. Everything in the arts and sciences which contradicts or goes beyond the National Socialist doctrine is looked upon as non-existent, simply by reason of the fact that the artists and thinkers concerned have left Germany. Having eliminated all opposition, the government is far from regretting the loss of eminent personalities which added to the permanent glory of the country. It is delighted to have to deal only with minds which are timid, with talents so mediocre that they can easily be directed. The method of selection is to ask all artists and writers to reply in writing to the two essential questions: Are you Aryan? Do you undertake to support the national government with all your strength? Anyone who refuses to sign immediately loses his public; there is no longer any audience in Germany to which he can address himself. The irreconcilables have been eliminated in advance; there remain only the weak and the mediocre to be dealt with, not to mention the shrewd who, after having made their way in a free regime are quite prepared to profit from the methods of a dictatorship.

Such "complete control over the whole intellectual and spiritual life of the nation" is a moral calamity the effects of which inevitably spread beyond the borders of Germany and the confines of this century. Freedom of thought is indispensable to growth to full intellectual and moral stature. If the western civilization is to be saved it must complete its education, and that soon.

For many years the "rising standard of living" (read, increasing complexity of demands) has been a matter for pride in the West and skilfully fanned by advertising and the urge to keep up with the neighbours. Production has been speeded up accordingly, and now the West is suffering from a plethora of goods and productive power far in excess of effective demand. Mr. K. K. Kawakami makes out a good case in April *Foreign Affairs* for a difference in living standard not meaning that one is superior and the other inferior:—

The question is simply one of difference. Transplant a Japanese mill hand to Lancashire, give him an iron bed with a soft mattress, put him on a ration of bread and butter, beefsteak, coffee and cream, and he will go on a strike, demanding Japanese bedding spread on a matted floor, and a ration of fish, rice and vegetables which, to him, are more palatable and wholesome. It is the misfortune of the British or